

American Centurions: Developing U.S. Army Tactical Leadership for the Twenty-first Century

**A Monograph
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Abstract

AMERICAN CENTURIONS: DEVELOPING U.S. ARMY TACTICAL LEADERSHIP
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The U.S. Army faces many challenges in the near future. Central to success in overcoming these challenges is the ability to develop tactical leaders capable of achieving Objective Force concepts. The course of Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrates that units have already put into practice Objective Force concepts in Afghanistan. The U.S. Army's vision of the future justifies moving towards a new operational doctrine. The threats posed by global instability and weapons of mass destruction affect the U.S. much more than in the past. Accordingly, the Objective Force doctrine provides the nation the capability to respond to a varying array of threats. Much more than attempting just organizational or technological change, the Objective Force concept aims to transform the U.S. Army's model of operations. This is the essence of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Past RMA's achieved success when leaders exploited technological advances. In the case of the First World War German Army, Second World War U.S. Army and Post-Vietnam U.S. Army, military forces developed and practiced transformations of doctrine before material and organizations evolved. Leaders made this possible. The key to success in executing transformational doctrine before all the enablers have developed is leader competence. Theory and practice associate a leader's level of competence with experience. Experience does not equal competence, but competence is not possible without experience. Objective Force leaders need augmented competence to overcome full spectrum global threats.

Developing competent leaders for the Objective Force represents a significant challenge for the U.S. Army in the Twenty-first Century. Leaders require larger skill sets to achieve the Objective Force characteristics: responsiveness, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable. The current leader selection and development model may not be able to provide leaders sufficiently competent in all these areas to exploit Objective Force Concepts and Capabilities. Transformation requires leaders who have mastery of their profession. Several indicators reveal shortcoming in the current officer accession process. In order to speed the transformation process, the U.S. Army needs to increase the effort directed towards leader development. Tactical leaders require greater experience to exploit Objective Force Concepts.

Several options exist to increase the competence of the U.S. Army's tactical leadership. The options proposed endeavor to provide enhanced experience during the officer selection and development process. The increase in training experience offers Second Lieutenants the foundation for increased leader competence. Leader competence enables the U.S. Army to take advantage of Objective Force concepts and capabilities.

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INTRODUCTION

The quality of the United States Army's combat arms company and platoon leadership determines the tactical performance of units in the conduct of military operations. *Field Manual 3.0 Operations* declares, "Leadership is the most dynamic element of combat power."¹ As such, the U.S. Army recognizes that leadership is central to successful accomplishment of military objectives. The U.S. Army relies upon adaptable leaders that learn to overcome varied tactical problems in ill-defined conditions because global commitments preclude the U.S. Army from optimizing for any particular type of combat operation or specific region. In *DA Pam 600-32 Leader Development for the Total Army*, the U.S. Army identifies "military training, operational experiences and self development as critical factors in officer development."² One of the fundamental challenges facing the U.S. Army in the Twenty-first Century is developing company level combat leaders prepared to conduct complex operations in uncertain environments.

Small unit leadership has always played an important role in warfare. The centurions of Rome were the first professional tactical military leaders. They performed tasks that merged modern officer and non-commissioned officer functions of discipline and tactical employment of formations. In this role, the centurions controlled the execution of the engagement even though they did not necessarily choose the time and place of battle.³ "The Roman centurion was a professional leader who had the respect of his soldiers because he had come up through the ranks and had previously demonstrated his ability in combat."⁴ In other words, the centurions demonstrated competent leadership because they had sufficient training and experiences to make

¹ U.S. Department of the Army. *FM 3-0, Operations*. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 4-7.

² U.S. Department of the Army. *600-32 Leader Development for the Total Army*. Internet: <http://www.redstone.army.mil/TIP/opt08/pam.chap5>, accessed 22 August 2001.

³ Hans Delbruck, *History of the Art of War, vol. I Warfare in Antiquity*, trans. Walter J. Renfro, Jr. (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1975), 429. And also in Peter Connolly, *Greece and Roman at War*, (London: Greenhill Books, 1998), 220-221.

⁴ Dave Grossman, *On Killing*, (Boston: Back Bay Books, 1995), 145-146.

sound decisions. Professional armies require centurion like leaders to operate with decentralized control in the accomplishment of complex missions under unpredictable conditions.

This paper aims to describe the leadership challenge facing the U.S. Army in the Twenty-first Century and identify the need to evaluate the way that we assess officers. The United States faces many threats in a volatile world characterized by regional instability, resource scarcity, increasing urbanization, and the proliferation of precise and lethal weapons. U.S. military power, the nature of military forces in regions of conflict, availability of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and the proliferation of lethal and precise weapons cause threat military forces to disperse on the battlefield or seek sanctuary among civilian populations. Indeed, the U.S. Army should expect to operate in a very complex environment for the next several decades.

The ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) further challenges U.S. Army leaders. Andrew Krepinevich, Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University, along with many others believes the Gulf War marks the beginning of the next RMA. Krepinevich explains: “Military revolutions compromise four elements: technological change, systems development, operational innovation, and organizational adaptation.”⁵ The best indicators of this emerging revolution from the perspective of land warfare are the development of Rapid Decisive Operations,⁶ Objective Force Concepts, activation of Interim Brigade Combat Teams and the nature of combat in Somalia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. These indicators represent the path of the current RMA.

The U.S. Army’s “organization adaptation” proposes to employ the Objective Force doctrine

⁵ Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” *The National Interest* 37 (Fall 1994, 30-42), 30.

⁶ “The RDO concept describes how a joint force commander, acting in conjunction with other instruments of national power can determine and employ the right force in a focused, non-linear campaign to achieve desired political/military outcomes. It is focused at the operational level on joint force operations in a smaller-scale contingency. However, the principles of RDO may be applied across the range of military operations.” U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Coordinating Draft - A Concept for Rapid Decisive Operations*, (Norfolk, VA: J9 Joint Futures Lab, 9 August 2001), Preface.

to defeat emerging threats that prefer to avoid direct combat because of the overwhelming capabilities of U.S. forces. By distributing units across the battlefield without losing organizational effectiveness, the U.S. Army defeats enemy efforts to avoid contact and prevents the enemy from targeting troop concentrations with theater ballistic missiles or weapons of mass effect (WME). Increasing complexity on the battlefield and operational requirements to distribute units across the battlefield demand progressively, competent tactical leadership that enables decentralized command.

Leadership has often played a vital role in achieving an RMA. Several examples of leader driven “organizational adaptations” include: the German Army’s Storm-tactics during the First World War, the U.S. Army’s Mechanization of Warfare during the Second World War and the U.S. Army’s AirLand Battle Doctrine between 1976 and 1991. These three “organizational adaptations” demonstrate the critical role that tactical leadership has played on past battlefields. The common thread that enabled leaders to affect change during these periods was tactical competence.

FM 6-22(22-100) Army Leadership divides leadership into three components: character, competence and actions. Decision-making occurs as an action aimed at influencing others by drawing upon both character and competence. *FM 6-22* expresses this relationship by stating that “Competence links character (knowing the right thing to do) and leadership (doing or influencing your people to do the right thing).”⁷ Doctrine provides that leaders gain competence by mastering conceptual, technical, tactical, and interpersonal skills. These skills provide the foundation for the leader to make decisions. *FM 6-22* explains that this process employs “sound judgment, reasoning logically, and managing resources wisely.”⁸ As such, decision-making abilities have a symbiotic relationship with leader competence.

⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 6-22(22-100) Army Leadership*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Officer, 1999), p. 2-1 and p. 2-25.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2-27.

Numerous theorists recognize that competence develops primarily through experience. Increasingly, military officers depend upon intuition, as the demand for rapid and sound decision-making does not permit leaders to use a planning centric decision process. Given the nature of future operational environments, the doctrine proposed for the Objective Force, and the weapons available to the lowest echelons, the U.S. Army should question if we have prepared our future leaders for these conditions.

The current state of U.S. Army officer selection and development may not provide sufficient training experiences for Objective Force platoon leaders to conduct decentralized operations in complex scenarios. Specifically, Second Lieutenants do not graduate from their basic courses with sufficient training or experiences necessary to execute Objective Force concepts. Even though Objective Force technologies have yet to be fielded, leaders need to begin practicing Objective Force Concepts with legacy systems and organizations. The U.S. Army should consider alternative methods of selecting and developing officers. Different countries and sister U.S. services use alternative approaches to access officers into the military. These alternative selection and development procedures provide ideas on how the U.S. Army could improve its current accession process.

The U.S. Army faces the dilemma of being both a bureaucracy and a profession. The military bureaucracy demands the most efficient officer accession system. The profession however judges officer selection and development not by quantity but in quality defined by effectiveness. Don Snider of the United States Military Academy recently studied the U.S. Army as a profession. He concluded that the U.S. Army has become overly bureaucratized. He challenges the U.S. Army to refocus effort on mastering professional expertise and developing new officers.⁹ Given the other factors already discussed, the U.S. Army needs to evaluate the suitability of the present officer selection and development process.

⁹ Don M. Snider, *The Future of the Army Profession*, (Briefing to the School of Advanced Military Studies, date Feb 2002, book to be published in March 2002).

I recommend that the U.S. Army evaluate several options designed to improve Second Lieutenant competence. The options include: Assessment and Selection Boards, Enlisted Service Prior to Pre-Commissioning, Unit Operational Train-Up, Extend Basic Officer Training Course, and the United States Military Academy (USMA) as the U.S. Army Commissioning Source. Each of these options increases training opportunities for new officers and provides potential avenues for the U.S. Army to exploit in changing the current accession system. Measuring the competence developed by these various programs and examining the suitability of the different programs within current U.S. Army officer accession system allows some comparison among the alternatives. Ultimately, the U.S. Army must consider if continuing with the present accession system provides the appropriate level of experience needed to allow tactical leaders to make sound decisions on the future battlefield.

PART ONE

LEADERSHIP FOR THE FUTURE

The trend of conflicts over the last ten years indicates that U.S. Army requires an increasingly competent officer corps with expert knowledge in warfighting and peacekeeping. The requirement to conduct full spectrum operations requires competence and agility to transition between varied operational missions.¹⁰ Continued efforts by the U.S. Army to move towards distributed operations by exercising decentralized control demand increased emphasis on tactical leadership. Organizations delegate decision-making authority to lower echelons to speed

¹⁰ The Objective Force requires agility because of the convergence of challenges described: “Where formerly the challenges associated with conducting conventional military campaigns against modern, industrial age armed forces were easily distinguishable from those associated with defeating an unconventional threat, and the latter similarly distinguishable from military support of civil activities such as disaster relief, internal security, and counter-terrorism, those distinctions increasingly are eroding.” U.S. Department of the Army, *Draft TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: The United States Army Objective Force Operational and Organizational Concept*, (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, November 2001), 7.

responsiveness. The U.S. Army expects future tactical leaders to make rapid and sound decisions in the employment of extremely lethal weapons during operations shaped by ill-defined political-military situations and complex terrain while calling for minimizing collateral damage. Under these circumstances, leaders conduct operations with strategic significance and constant media coverage. The recent U.S. experiences in full spectrum operations conducted in such places as Iraq, Somalia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Afghanistan highlight the need for highly trained professional officers and non-commissioned officers. Without quality leadership, the U.S. Army cannot effectively accomplish the goals established in the *U.S. Army White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force* or in *Draft TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: The U.S. Army Objective Force*.¹¹ The tactical leaders of the future battlefield will undoubtedly confront situations calling for decentralized control of non-contiguous units that must near-simultaneously execute offensive, defensive, stability and support tasks. The U.S. Army's concept of the Objective Force seems beyond the capability of the current leader selection and development process.

IMPACTS OF FUTURE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ON LEADERSHIP

Many authors have identified the changing nature of war. "The Clash of Civilizations", "Resource Wars," "Virtual War," "The Coming Anarchy" represent common themes on the roots of modern conflict and emerging nature of war.¹² Increasingly, non-state actors such as organized crime, tribal factions and terrorist groups attempt to challenge the existing world order by

¹¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0 Objective Force* and U.S Department of the Army, *United States Army White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force*, Internet: <http://www.army.mil/features/WhitePaper/default.htm>, accessed 22 February 2002.

¹² Several authors have described the effects of the end of the Cold War and globalization on the state of the international security environment. Some of the most prominent books on the subject include: Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Robert Kaplan, *Warrior Politics, Why Leadership Demands Pagan Ethos*, (New York: Random House, 2001); Robert Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy*, (New York: Random House, 2000); Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War, Kosovo and Beyond*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000); Michael T. Klare, *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001); and Ralph Peters, *Fighting for the Future, Will America Triumph?*, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999).

ignoring the monopoly that nation states claim on the use of war as an instrument of policy. Varied rates of economic growth create friction between those cultures and individuals that gain economic benefit while others stagnate. Population explosions and youth bubbles create greater frustration while consuming greater resources and limiting opportunities. These large disenchanted youth populations tend to cause unrest.¹³ In doctrine such as *FM 3-0 Operations* and Objective Force concepts, the U.S. Army seeks adaptation to meet the challenge presented by these emerging threat forms. Objective Force leaders must possess sufficient confidence and competence to conduct decentralized and distributed operations in operational environments that define this new global instability.

The U.S. Army's *Draft TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: The U.S. Army Objective Force* recognizes the emerging nature of future warfare. *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0* postulates that "The rise of ethnic, religious, and tribal rivalries unleashed since the end of the Cold War, together with growing access of terrorist and criminal groups to advanced weaponry, has engendered new forms of violence that increasingly exceed the ability of civil authorities to manage, inflict immense human suffering, and in some circumstances risk escalation to serious regional and even global conflict."¹⁴ In both *FM 3-0* and *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0*, the U.S. Army echoes themes from many contemporary authors in characterizing the emerging strategic setting for military operations. Globalization threatens to create tension between those people that benefit from modernization and those suffering the economic, political and social consequences of disproportionate progress.¹⁵ Cultural and religious motivations clash with globalization to further complicate contests for power and influence. Additionally, competition for scarce resources and unequal distribution of resources provide further justification for conflict. Finally, rapid population growth and mass migrations to cities create conditions ripe for

¹³ Kaplan, *Warrior Politics*, 3-5 and 11 passim.

¹⁴ U.S Department of the Army, *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: Objective Force*, 8.

¹⁵ My concepts of the phenomena of globalization can be primarily attributed to Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, (New York: Anchor Books, 1999).

violence. In *The Future Operational Environment*, the U.S. Army predicts that instability and regional conflicts represent the most immediate security threats for the next several decades.¹⁶ All these conditions demand that the U.S. Army develop tactical forces possessing the capability to rapidly transition between offense, defense, stability and support operations even at the platoon level.

The decline of the state in future conflicts contributes to the break down in the Clausewitzian Trinity that moderated nation state conflicts. Clausewitz's "Remarkable Trinity" served to balance the three forces that he believed determined the nature and intensity of war: the passion inspired by the population, the policy that government institutes to control war, and the element of chance that resides in the character of the commanders and their armies.¹⁷ Since the emergence of nation states, the government and military regulated the level of violence employed to achieve victory. As the power of the nation state declines, and the peoples' passion for victory in conflict increases, war may move towards unabated violence. As the potential for unmitigated brutality arises, the U.S. Army may find itself involved in precarious situations in which the enemy has no prohibitions on the use of force. Under these conditions, the U.S. Army recognizes the increasing need to coordinate with Joint and Combined Services, other U.S. agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations. The Objective Force intends to meet these challenges by improving doctrinal and organizational capabilities to conduct full spectrum operations that contribute to stability in war torn regions of the world.¹⁸

The U.S. Army must also prepare to conduct frequent operations in and around urban areas because these are the likely places for conflicts to occur. In order to conduct stability and support operations, the military must go to where the population is located. Political concerns may also

¹⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, *The Future Operational Environment*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS.: Training and Doctrine Command Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, May 2001), 1.

¹⁷ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

¹⁸ Concept calls for units that require less augmentation. *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: Objective Force*, 33.

force military action in and around urban areas as cities often have political and informational significance. Finally, enemy forces may embrace urban areas for defensive purposes because these areas negate some of the advantages that U.S. forces possess in the areas of reconnaissance, intelligence and precision guided munitions.¹⁹ The former commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, retired General Charles C. Krulak, proposed the concept of the ‘three block war’. In the ‘three block war’, he expects brigade sized military forces to conduct full spectrum operations near simultaneously with forces attacking or defending in one block, providing security during stability missions in another block and sustaining refugees during support operations in a third block. Krulak states, “In this environment, conventional doctrine and organizations may mean very little. It is an environment born of change.”²⁰ Recognizing these trends, the U.S. Army updated its doctrine with the release of the 2001 edition of *FM 3-0 Operations and Draft TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: The U.S. Army Objective Force*. The U.S. Army also created more agile units such as the Interim Brigade Combat Team that allow testing of Objective Force Concepts by utilizing equipment designed for rapid deployment and tactics appropriate for full spectrum operations. The U.S. Army has chosen to embrace full spectrum urban warfare given the likelihood of encountering urban terrain in areas with destabilizing forces such as population concentrations and intermingling of varied religions and cultures. Within this complex social-political situation and amongst civilian populations indistinguishable from warring factions, the U.S. Army expects small units to effectively transition between combat, stability and support operations.

U.S. Army *FM 3-0 Operations* describes the current operating environment as full spectrum operations. *FM 3-0* explains “As missions change from promoting peace to deterring war and

¹⁹ Robert F. Hahn, II and Bonnie Jezior, “Urban Warfare and the Urban Warfighter of 2025,” *Parameters*, U.S. Army War College Quarterly, (Summer 1999), Internet, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99summer/hahn.htm>, accessed 5 December 01.

²⁰ Charles C. Krulak, “The Three Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas,” *Vital Speeches of the Day* LXIV-5 (15 December 1997, 139-141), 139.

from resolving conflict to war itself, the combinations of and transitions between these operations require, skillful assessment, planning, preparation, and execution.”²¹ In full spectrum operations, U.S. Army units prepare to perform offensive, defensive, stability and support operations either simultaneously or sequentially with minimal transition time. In order to achieve all required missions, the doctrine recognizes the need for leaders with increased competence and character.²² To succeed in these dynamic and complex operational environments, the U.S. Army needs to further decentralize command and control thereby allowing improved tactical responsiveness.

IMPACTS OF TECHNOLOGY AND TACTICS ON LEADERSHIP

Increasingly decentralized operations, enhanced firepower, greater battlefield complexity and tactical engagements with grander operational or strategic significance, demand greater professional competence at the company and platoon level. The recent experience in Afghanistan provides ample evidence that the U.S. military has the capability to deliver guided munitions with unprecedented precision when provided timely and accurate targeting data from ground maneuver forces.²³ With adequate communications architecture, U.S. Army companies and platoons should expect to provide targeting data for precision strike weapons.²⁴ Ground forces already possess very lethal capabilities in their organic weapons capabilities. These forces arrive supported by readily available firepower in the form of mortars, artillery, rockets and attack helicopters. Enhanced informational capabilities enabled by the communications and processor miniaturization allow U.S. Army units to approximate near perfect friendly situational awareness and shared awareness of enemy known and templated activities. These systems allow improved decision-making so long as leaders have the competence to exploit technology.

²¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 3-0 Operations*, p. 1-16.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 1-18.

²³ Michael R. Gordon, “‘New’ U.S. War: Commandos, Airstrikes And Allies On The Ground,” *New York Times*, December 29, 2001, Internet: https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird.cgi?doc_url=/Dec2001/e20011231newus.htm, accessed 2 January 2002.

²⁴ Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks, “1’s And 0’s Replacing Bullets In U.S. Arsenal, Success in Afghanistan Propels Shift to Equipping Forces With Digital Arms,” *Washington Post*, February 2, 2002.

Sophisticated equipment and operations require highly trained soldiers and leaders. This in part explains the expanding role of Special Operations Forces such as Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations and the increasing priority given to Information Operations. These skill sets may become more conventional as the environment of conflict migrates away from state on state conflicts to clashes between nation states and non-state or intra-state actors. In order to conduct full spectrum operations, conventional squads and sections during operations in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo conducted Mission Rehearsal Exercises to prepare for peacekeeping tasks beyond traditional offensive or defensive military roles. In Afghanistan, the world witnessed a Special Forces A-Team conducting liaison and targeting missions operating along side an infantry squad of 10th Mountain Division providing local security for the Special Forces element.²⁵ Perhaps this portends the future of Objective Force concepts of blending conventional and special purpose capabilities.

Future soldiers may need to serve in apprentice like positions first learning the basics of traditional combat operations before moving on to complex situations such as those presented by stability and support operations. The Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College predicts “Future landpower will probably be based on ground units that are small and highly autonomous, yet extremely versatile, flexible, and lethal.”²⁶ The U.S. Army faces a significant challenge in modifying existing recruitment and personnel policies in order to man the force with soldiers and leaders capable of operating advanced information systems and controlling lethal and precise weapons, all while conducting full spectrum operations.

The RAND Corporation proposes several theories on the future arrayal of ground forces. Two possible variations include “Swarming on the Battlefield” and “Virtual Corporation”. In

²⁵ Observed on national TV when covering the Qalai Janghi prison riot vicinity Mazar-e Sharif, on or about 28 November 2001, finally reported to the press see Vernon Loeb, “Division That Follows Subtraction,” *Washington Post*, 26 February 2002, Internet: https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird.cgi?doc_url=/Feb2002/e20020226division.htm, accessed: 26 February 2002.

²⁶ Steven Metz et al. *The Future of American Landpower*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1996), 17.

Swarming & The Future of Conflict, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt identify three historical paradigms of military organization and doctrine: melee (individual combat), massing (linear and open order combat) and maneuver (air and mechanized combat). Arquilla and Ronfeldt perceive an ongoing shift to a fourth paradigm of “swarming” that is enabled by information technologies and precision weapons.²⁷ “Swarming” doctrine, proposes that units operate in a distributed pattern and mass only when required to overwhelm enemy forces. Dispersion protects U.S. forces from becoming targets for Weapons of Mass Effects (WME) attacks. “Swarming” also counters enemy efforts to disperse by focusing friendly distributed operations to confront enemy pockets. This then presents a dilemma to the enemy to either consolidate thereby exposing themselves to operational fires or fight dispersed against Objective Force organic fire and maneuver capabilities. This synergistic affect of ground maneuver and operational fires poses multiple dilemmas upon threat forces. In order to achieve “swarm” capabilities, Arquilla and Ronfeldt suggest “A military that wants to conduct swarming, either of fire or in force, will have to habituate itself to the devolution of a great deal of command and control authority to a large number of smaller maneuver units. These units will be widely dispersed throughout the battlespace and will likely represent all the various sea, air, and ground services—putting a premium on interservice coordination for purposes of both sharing information and combining in joint ‘task groups.’”²⁸ The U.S. Army’s Objective Force resembles the “swarming” organization that RAND proposes.

In *The “Virtual Corporation” and Army Organization*, Francis Fukuyama and Abram N. Shulsky recognize the U.S. Army’s requirement to generate increased initiative and responsibility at lower levels of tactical command.²⁹ Companies and platoons should expect to enable both

²⁷ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Swarming & The Future of Conflict*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, 2000), 7

²⁸ Arquilla and Ronfeldt, *Swarming & The Future of Conflict*, 45.

²⁹ Francis Fukuyama and Abram N. Shulsky, *The “Virtual Corporation” and Army Organization*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 1997), xiv-xv.

innovation and adaptation. The U.S. Army's dilemma in achieving decentralization manifests itself in the recognized need to further decentralize control and to increase the experience and training level of subordinate echelons.³⁰ Both the theory of "swarming" and "Virtual Corporation", challenge the existing U.S. Army hierarchal command and organization because of the demand for experienced leaders at lower echelons of command.

The U.S. Army's Objective Force Concept aims to create units capable of achieving these concepts of "swarming" and "virtual" command. The Objective Force design parameters include "full spectrum forces with special purpose capabilities, knowledge—based Operations, advanced C4ISR and information superiority, combined arms at the lowest tactical level and modularity."³¹ Given these design parameters, the Objective Force "sees first, understands first, acts first and finishes decisively" as a part of its operational concept that leverages technological advantages.³² Critical to achieving this concept, the Objective Force subordinate units must conduct distributed maneuver to achieve a "swarm" of effects without concentrating forces.³³ *Draft TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: The U.S. Army Objective Force* proposes to transform the U.S. Army into an adaptable force capable of meeting any foreseen missions in support of the National Security Strategy. Leadership at the lowest tactical levels represents one of the greatest limiting factors in achieving these concepts.

LEADERSHIP LIMITS TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

Leadership may prove to be the linchpin of achieving Objective Force Concepts. The U.S. Army has focused a greater amount of effort towards a few of the doctrine, training, leader development, organization, material, and soldiers (DOTLMS) areas necessary to create the Objective Force. In the doctrinal realm, the U.S. Army published *FM 3-0 Operations* and *FM 3-*

³⁰ Ibid., 78.

³¹ U.S Department of the Army, *Draft TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: Objective Force*, 23-25.

³² Ibid., 25-26.

³³ Ibid., 30.

90 *Tactics* and plans to publish several manuals still in draft (i.e. *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: The U.S. Army Objective Force, FM 5-0 Army Planning, and FM 6-0 Command and Control*).³⁴ Similarly, the U.S. Army conducted digitization-training exercises with the Fourth Infantry Division and the Interim Brigade Combat Team to test new material and organizational concepts. While doctrine, material and training have dominated the transformation process, little effort seems directed towards transforming leader selection and development. History demonstrates that effort towards leader development has great potential for creating a climate conducive to transformation.

To date, the U.S. Army's transformation effort focused largely on technology and materials. Although these systems are critical for realizing the Objective Force, leadership represents a significant limit to achieving the desired endstate. Peter Senge, Director of the Center for Organizational Learning at Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Sloan School of Management, explains the "Limits to Growth" Archetype in *The Fifth Discipline*. According to Senge's Archetype, growth actions enhance performance while limiting actions hinder performance.³⁵ Technology currently represents the growing action for the U.S. Army that enables the Objective Force to manipulate information to "see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively." Meanwhile, leadership represents one of the most significant limiting actions to achieving the Objective Force Concept. The current state of leader development in the U.S. Army does not provide sufficient experiences to leverage rapid decision-making with Objective Force capabilities.³⁶ To achieve Objective Force Concepts, the U.S. Army must balance the

³⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 3-0 Operations*, Bibliography-2 to 4.

³⁵ Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline, The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*, (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990), 379-380.

³⁶ Officers "do not believe they are being afforded sufficient opportunity to learn from the results of their own decision and actions...The Army has no model reflecting how it thinks about training and leader development. It has no decision management process to assess the components of its training and leader development." U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Training and Leader Development Panel), Internet, <http://www.army.mil/features/ATLD/report.pdf>, accessed 10 August 2001, 1-5.

effort applied towards transforming leader development with that directed towards developing doctrine, training, organizations and material.

In order to master technology and revolutionize warfare, as called for by the Objective Force Concept, the U.S. Army requires increasingly professional and competent leadership. According to *The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study Report to the Army*, the existing officer selection and development process produces minimally confident and competent leaders upon graduation from various officer basic courses.³⁷ These Second Lieutenants then hypothetically master technical and tactical skills during operational assignments. By comparison, British, German and Israeli military forces conduct a more rigorous screening and training process during their officer selection and development process. Each of these foreign militaries, employ either a formal officer assessment and selection process or require operational commanders to assess and recommend candidates for officer training. Given the complexity of the global strategic setting and the design of future forces, the U.S. Army cannot move forward with transformation without conducting a full analysis of the adequacy of our existing officer selection and development process. History represents an appropriate point of departure to examine leadership's role in RMA.

PART TWO

TACTICAL OFFICER LEADERSHIP DURING RMA

Tactical leadership frequently determines the outcomes of battles. Confident and competent leadership serves as a prerequisite for discipline and training. The role of small unit leadership emerged as a significant factor on the battlefield when soldiers dispersed to overcome increased

³⁷ “The quality and relevance of OES instruction from OBC through CGSOC does not meet the expectations of many officers. The OES sufficiently teaches branch technical and tactical skills, but combat support and combat service support officers are not adequately taught the basic combat skills necessary to lead and protect their units in full spectrum operations.” Ibid., 11.

weapons lethality. This trend revolutionized warfare during the First World War with the development of Storm-tactics and continued with the development of mechanized tactics throughout the Second World War and remainder of the twentieth-century. In this period, the mechanization of warfare caused an RMA to develop doctrine and organizations to accommodate new technology. The development of effective tactical leadership became increasingly critical for success on the mechanized battlefield. Similarly, the success of the U.S. Army in transforming in the age of digitization depends greatly on small unit leadership.

Weapons lethality over time caused soldiers to disperse on the battlefield resulting in the phenomena Dr. James R. Schneider of the U.S. Army's School of Advanced Military Studies calls the 'Empty Battlefield'. The 'Empty Battlefield' requires increased emphasis on small unit leadership to control decentralized and distributed operations.³⁸ The First World War marked the final episode of open order linear tactics. Small unit leadership emerged from the shadow of large battalions to overcome the killing zone of modern weapons. The Germans accomplished this first in the execution of Storm-tactics.

The German Army development of Storm-tactics during the First World War established the start point for the future of decentralized military operations in the twentieth century. Storm-tactics allowed entire German armies to conduct decentralized and distributed operations to achieve tactically significant victories on the Western Front.³⁹ In *Stomtroop Tactics*, Bruce Gudmundsson explains that the leadership of the German officer corps enabled the German Army to execute decentralized and distributed operations. These officers displayed independent thought and action because they possessed a self-analyzing and learning culture. Significantly, German tactical officers also had more experience than either their French or British counterpart officers

³⁸ Developed in James J. Schneider, "The Theory of the Empty Battlefield," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute*, (Sep 1987) 37-44 passim and also called "The Empty But Crowded Battlefield" in Chris Bellamy, *The Future of War*, (New York: ST. Martin's Press, 1987), 274-277 passim.

³⁹ Timothy T. Lupfer, *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981), 49-54.

because the Germans involved their officers in the development of tactical doctrine and the implementation training of new tactics.⁴⁰ James Corum recognizes the same trend in his book *The Roots of Blitzkrieg*. Corum emphasizes that the effort to train and develop effective small unit leaders encouraged German commanders to allow greater subordinate initiative than allied armies.⁴¹ The German Army's development and execution of Storm-tactics validated the need for professional tactical leadership in the early stages of mechanized warfare era.

During the Interwar Years, the German Army published the *Truppenfuhrung* to promote development of innovative and adaptive leaders (see Appendix 1). The document established the doctrinal and leadership foundations for tactics that later became known as Blitzkrieg operations. Authors such as James Corum, Williamson Murray and Shimon Naveh recognize that the *Truppenfuhrung* remains one of the most significant contributions to the doctrine of modern operations and leadership.⁴² With the *Truppenfuhrung*, the German Army established the foundation of the Blitzkrieg operations and leadership. The doctrine reinforced the German Army traditions of leadership from the front, reconnaissance pull and decentralized control. During the Second World War, tactical excellence in the German Army inspired by the *Truppenfuhrung* allowed the *Wehrmacht* to achieve impressive tactical successes with neither qualitative nor quantitative superiority.⁴³ The success of German doctrine on the tactical battlefield demonstrates the critical role that small unit leadership plays in innovation and adaptation.

The U.S. Army adopted the emphasis on tactical initiative and leadership similar to the German Army. The leadership chapter of the 1941 *FM 100-5, Field Service Regulation*,

⁴⁰ Bruce I. Gudmundsson, *Stormtroop Tactics*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1989), 174-176.

⁴¹ James S. Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg*, (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1992), 10-13.

⁴² Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki ed. and trans. *On the German Art of War, Truppenfuhrung*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 2-3.

⁴³ Williamson Murray, "Armored Warfare: The British, French, and German experiences," *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, ed. Murray and Allan R. Millet, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 44-45.

Operations reads remarkably similar to the *Truppenfuhrung* (see Appendix 2).⁴⁴ Similar to the current challenge facing the U.S. Army, during the Second World War, developing competent tactical leaders represented a great challenge to the rapidly expanding army. The U.S. Army understood the important role of tactical leadership. The 1941 *FM 100-5* stated, “The first demand in war is decisive action. Commander inspire confidence in their subordinates by their decisive conduct and their ability to gain material advantage over the enemy.”⁴⁵ Fortunately, the interwar years had caused stagnated officer promotions that resulted in many U.S. Army leaders developing extensive tactical experience while serving in prolonged operational assignments. When the U.S. Army expanded, the depth of experience that battalion and regimental officers possessed enabled these leaders to mentor their subordinate officers and cull those who were not suited for tactical leadership roles.⁴⁶

The experienced battalion and regimental commanders understood training and they facilitated the rapid expansion of the U.S. Army by preparing their units for war. Stephen Ambrose provides an anecdotal example of this process as he describes the development of Lieutenant Winters from platoon leader to battalion commander in the book *Band of Brothers*.⁴⁷ John Sloan Brown’s *Draftee Division* provides an example of the typical experiences of a conscript unit.⁴⁸ Not all lieutenants measured up to Winters, but many proved to be capable

⁴⁴ *FM 100-5, Field Service Regulation, Operations May 22, 1941*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Reprinted by U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1992), 18-21.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁴⁶ “Generals Marshall and McNair considered the selection of cadre for new divisions one of their most important missions. Together these chiefs of staff picked the division commanders and ruled on nominations for regimental commanders and primary staffs. A further forty-six officers in each division were chosen by the heads of branches and services for key positions as battalion command...All of the sixty senior cadremen had seen appreciable troop duty, and all had attended the army school system insofar as was appropriate for prewar rank. Most had also taught in ROTC and army schools. Thus they knew the generation that would provide the company grade officers of World War II, and they had polished their professional knowledge while in an academic setting. The sixty experienced cadre officers would educate a contingent of officers twelve times their number. These would in turn train the division. Given time, the senior officers were qualified to develop the junior officers, shuffle them around a bit, and get the right men in the right jobs.” In John S. Brown, *Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II*, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), 24-25.

⁴⁷ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Band of Brothers*, (New York: Touchstone, 1992).

⁴⁸ Brown, *Draftee Division*, 24-25.

combat leaders. The average performance of the U.S. Army division verifies this claim of effectiveness.⁴⁹ Subsequently, during the Second World War, senior officers encouraged small unit leaders to develop innovative solutions to field problems. Similar to the First World War Germany Army, the U.S. Army expected tactical leaders to develop solutions to overcome problems at their level.⁵⁰ The higher command assisted by collecting and disseminating these tactics, techniques and procedures.⁵¹ Ultimately, the U.S. Army proved to be a very effective fighting force because tactical leaders proved both innovative and adaptive in learning how to fight their units.

The U.S. Army found significant problems in attempting to regenerate leadership due to the significant number of small unit leader casualties in combat. The requirement to rapidly replace the large number of combat arms leaders meant that officer selection and assessment suffered.⁵² Whereas before, assignments to operational units mobilizing for war prepared leaders for combat, now these leaders had to rely only on their institutional training. Units that conducted long mobilizations trained for extended periods and could sort out those unsuited for leadership positions. During sustained combat in the European Theater of Operations, units no longer had the time to train new leaders. Enlarging the commissioning process created lower quality replacement officers who did not meet the expectations of the seasoned combat units.⁵³ Identifying this problem serves to highlight the critical role that small unit leaders play in battle especially during periods when warfare evolves rapidly. Significantly, the Second World War experience demonstrates that small unit leader competence relates directly to officer experience.

⁴⁹ Several books in the early 1980's emphasized the superiority of the Wehrmacht over U.S. Army divisions, but many recent books have provided substantial evidence that the U.S. Army combat divisions fought quite effectively. Discussed in detail in the introduction in Peter R. Mansoor, *The GI Offensive in Europe*, (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1999).

⁵⁰ Michael Doubler, *Closing with the Enemy*, (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1994), 289.

⁵¹ Ibid. , 270-271.

⁵² Described in Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, (Washington D.C.: Historical Division U.S. Army, 1948) 158 and 328.

⁵³ Kent R. Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, (Washington D.C.: Historical Division U.S. Army, 1947), 48 and 51.

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War and under the threat of increased Soviet conventional force capabilities in Europe, the U.S. Army looked to reinvent itself. The renewed emphasis on leadership stems from the effort of General William DePuy, the first commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), to revise the U.S. Army's operational concept in 1976. DePuy became displeased with the state of doctrine and its emphasis on positional and attritional battles in the post Vietnam U.S. Army.⁵⁴ Accordingly, he led the effort to reemphasize maneuver warfare. His efforts led to the development of *AirLand Battle* doctrine that identified the crucial role leadership played in generating combat power.⁵⁵ This doctrine enabled the U.S. Army to achieve stunning victories during operations in Grenada, Panama, and Iraq. In *Certain Victory*, General Robert Scales writes "The officer and NCO educational systems not only improved the professional skill of leaders, but inculcated and nourished in them the initiative and confidence to extend themselves beyond the bounds of set procedures and doctrine."⁵⁶ The *AirLand Battle* U.S. Army developed experience and competence through Combat Training Centers, emphasis on small group instruction and formalized self-development in the Military Qualification System. Small unit leadership proved critical to achieving the success that the U.S. Army found in Desert Storm. The U.S. Army's performance marked the high point of the mechanization of war doctrine.

Since Desert Storm, the U.S. Army has conducted operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and most recently Afghanistan. Small unit leadership has remained critical to enable the accomplishment of frequently decentralized and distributed operations. However, the complex nature of these operations revealed weaknesses in the U.S. Army's training programs. In order to

⁵⁴ Robert A. Doughty, *The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), 49. also in Paul H. Herbert, *Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100—5, Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988), 5-16.

⁵⁵ John L. Romjue, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982*, (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984), 69.

⁵⁶ Robert H. Scales, *Certain Victory*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994), 363.

overcome these shortcomings, units conducted extensive situational training exercises and brigade sized mission rehearsal exercises. As digital technologies continue to drive an informational RMA, the U.S. Army must reassess the officer development process to ensure that leaders possess sufficient tactical competence and confidence to operate at the limits of decentralized control. All the while, the U.S. Army officer accession remains postured to support large-scale mobilization on the Second World War model. The current selection and development emphasizes quantity over quality. The accession process prioritizes supporting personnel management through quantity of officers produced rather than enabling tactical units with the highest quality officers. In this era of the informational RMA as in previous RMAs, the U.S. Army must promote the development of innovative and adaptive small unit leaders that can lead the army through an era of change.

PART THREE

INTUITIVE DECISION-MAKING AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL OF WAR

Decision-making has always been one of the most crucial roles that tactical leaders play on the battlefield. The digitization of warfare reinforces the role of tactical leaders as decision-makers and allows further decentralization of authority. Arthur Corbett from the Strategic Studies Institute believes that: “A ‘proliferation of battlefield decision-makers’ will be the proximate cause of the next RMA.”⁵⁷ Tactical leader competence presents significant limits to

⁵⁷ Arthur J. Corbett, “Proliferating Decisionmakers: Root Cause of the Next Revolution in Military Affairs”, *Future Leadership, Old Issues, New Methods*, (Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 28. And many others draw similar conclusions regarding the potential for decentralized control and distributed operations see: Terry M. Peck, *Leadership – A Doctrine Lost and Found*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, First Term AY 89/90); Michael A. Burton, *Command and Control*; (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 6 December 1986); and Douglas Bland ed. *Backbone of the Army, Non-Commissioned Officers in the Future Army*, (Montreal, Canada: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, 2000).

continued decentralization. Objective Force platoon and company leaders require increasingly greater knowledge and skills that often take longer to master.⁵⁸ In order to achieve greater decentralized control during distributed operations, the U.S. Army needs to increase leader competence.

Recent theories explain that tactical decision-making relies extensively upon intuition due to the circumstances of the problem solving. The conditions under which U.S. Army tactical leaders make tactical decisions resembles the features that Gary Klein describes in *Sources of Power* as naturalistic decision-making settings: time pressure, experienced decision makers, inadequate information, unclear goals, poorly defined procedures, cue learning, context, and dynamic conditions. Klein defines intuitive decision-making under these conditions as Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD).⁵⁹ The U.S. Army acknowledges the role of intuitive decision-making in *DRAFT FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production*.⁶⁰ Once the U.S. Army officially recognizes intuitive decision making as an approved form of decision-making, TRADOC can be expected to develop programs of instruction designed to develop RPD in decision-makers. Although, informal training to react to uncertain circumstances has long been a part of military training, including intuitive decision-making in doctrine demands increased effort towards developing this capability in tactical leaders.

Improving the intuitive capabilities of the U.S. Army's tactical leaders allows platoon and company leaders to make quicker and more decentralized decisions. Here in lies the power of the transformation in speeding the decision making process. The task is made difficult by the numerous skills tactical decision-makers must master to achieve useable intuition.

⁵⁸ Gary Yukl, "Leadership Competencies Required for the New Army and Approaches for Developing Them," *Out of the Box Leadership*, ed. Hunt, James G et. al. (Stamford, CT: JAI Press, 1999), 273.

⁵⁹ Gary Klein, *Sources of Power*, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999), conditions on 4-6 and RPD on 17.

⁶⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *DRAFT FM 5-0 Army Planning and Orders Production*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Officer), p. 2-1 and p. 1-10.

FM 6-22 Leadership explains the role of Direct Leadership skills:

Direct leaders are first-line leaders. They apply the conceptual skill of critical reasoning and creative thinking to determine the best way to accomplish the mission. They use ethical reasoning to make sure their choice is the right thing to do, and they use reflective thinking to assess and improve team performance, their subordinates, and themselves. They employ the interpersonal skills of communicating and supervising to get the job done. They develop their people by mentoring and counseling and mold them into cohesive teams by training them to standard.⁶¹

U.S. Army lieutenants must master technical and tactical skills before they can develop conceptual skills that employ technical and tactical means. Finally, leaders must effectively communicate these concepts to their subordinates. Leader skills: technical, tactical, conceptual and interpersonal enable effective tactical leadership.

Of all the direct leader skills, effective conceptual skills take the most time mature.

Conceptual skills permit tactical leaders to develop ways to achieve their mission given constraints from higher headquarters in order to overcome existing terrain, weather, and enemy forces. Leaders generally learn conceptual skills through trial and error during events such as situational training exercises that require rapid decision-making under simulated combat conditions. Officers gain conceptual skills such as critical reasoning, creative thinking and situational understanding primarily by practice, experimentation and experience.⁶² Shawn Noble and Jon Fallensen of the U.S. Army Research Institute found that “As adaptability, flexibility, and versatility become more important for future leaders so too will the need for better-developed conceptual skills. Today’s leaders need to consider the costs of using highly analytic approaches (e.g., MDMP) in a world that is highly time constrained, information rich, and constantly changing.”⁶³ Improving conceptual skills enables leaders to reason logically and rapidly to make sound decisions in the face of complex situation.

⁶¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 6-22 Army Leadership*, p. 4-14.

⁶² Shawn A. Noble and Jon J. Fallensen, *Identifying Conceptual Skills of Future Battle Commanders*, (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Mar 2000), 27.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 41

Technical and tactical skills enable leaders to employ “sound judgment” and “manage resources”.⁶⁴ Intuitive decision-making occurs because leaders visualize the outcome of the engagement before it is complete by drawing on technical and tactical competence. Tactical skills allow the leader to quickly assess the situation and take appropriate battlefield actions. Technical skills support tactical actions by allowing leaders to predict with some certainty what assets (time, space or resources) they require to accomplish a task. Competence empowers the leader to make rapid and sound decisions. In order to achieve unprecedented decentralized control, even platoon level leaders require sufficient experience to recognize and correlate the relationship of terrain, enemy and friendly unit capabilities. Klein explains that leaders gain intuitive decision-making capabilities primarily through experiential learning of pattern recognition.⁶⁵ For U.S. Army leaders this equates to tactical competence that facilitates pattern recognition and visualizing opportunities either on the battlefield or in the conduct of stability and support operations.

Interpersonal skills allow leaders to communicate their vision and guide their units towards a desired endstate. The U.S. Army includes several activities involved in interpersonal skills: coaching, teaching, counseling, motivating and empowering.⁶⁶ Bass describes the critical role that interpersonal skills play in his book *Transformational Leadership*. He writes “The charismatic component of transformational leadership involves a variety of dynamics, one of which enhances the commitment of followers to charismatic leaders is the followers’ perception of competence of the leader.”⁶⁷ Interpersonal skill provides the means for the leader to influence the unit through actions and words. Furthermore, rapid and sound decision-making particularly at the platoon level, where soldiers see their decision-makers in action, encourages soldier

⁶⁴ U.S Department of the Army, *FM 6-22 Army Leadership*, p. 2-27.

⁶⁵ Klein, *Sources of Power*, 31.

⁶⁶ U.S Department of the Army, *FM 6-22 Army Leadership*, p. 2-25.

⁶⁷ Bernard M. Bass, *Transformational Leadership: Industry, Military and Educational Impact*, (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1998), 25.

confidence in their leaders.⁶⁸ There exist duality in the relationship between the leader's ability to communicate effectively using interpersonal skill and the leader's competence in making rapid and sound decisions. Interpersonal skills are essential to the decision-maker because the leader's effectiveness is directly linked to how well the unit executes the decision.

Despite the need to develop intuitive decision-making capabilities, most of the training that Second Lieutenants receive emphasizes rational choice decision-making that focuses on the troop leading procedures.⁶⁹ Traditionally, initial officer training focuses on rational choice decision-making because doctrine proscribed the procedural process and because new officers rarely have sufficient experience to make use of intuitive decision-making. Lane training and battle drill training provide opportunities for new officers to learn intuitive decision-making.⁷⁰

Unfortunately, officer basic courses provide only limited leadership experiences since all officers rotate through leadership positions to provide equal experiences. Realistically, the U.S. Army expects officers to develop most of their RPD capabilities in their operational assignments with the assistance of non-commissioned officers and under the mentorship of senior officers.

The U.S. Army should increase the emphasis on intuitive decision-making at both institutional and operational training. Situational training exercises followed by after action reviews and retraining provide the best opportunity to master intuitive decision-making. One U.S. Army leader involved in transformation proposes to provide leaders with "Continuous Immersion Training" to condense leader's experiences.⁷¹ In *Out of the Box Leadership*, several authors recommend progressive decision-making training that increases the leader responsibility

⁶⁸ Ibid., 36.

⁶⁹ The Welcome Packet describes IOBC's goals to familiarize Second Lieutenants with tactical and technical competencies. The IOBC Advance Sheet explains this in detail. The Week 7 Training Schedule explains that these weeks "are the true start of the IOBC." As such IOBC only provides 4 to 5 weeks of situational training aimed at developing decision-making skills. Information also available at the 2nd Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment Web Site, Internet, <http://www-benning.army.mil/11th/2-11INF/index.htm>, accessed, 21 February 2002.

⁷⁰ Klein, *Sources of Power*, 97-98.

⁷¹ James M. Dubik, "Creating Combat Power for the 21st Century," *The Land Warfare Papers No. 25*, (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, 1996), 15.

and mission complexity to gradually increase capabilities.⁷² *United States Army White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force* calls for this type of training to occur in order for leaders to operate in fast moving situations, draw appropriate conclusions, and make sound and rapid decisions.⁷³ Mastering intuitive decision-making improves leader innovation, adaptability and effectiveness.

If the next RMA in military affairs depends on “proliferating decision makers”, then the U.S. Army must assess the effectiveness of the current officer selection and development process in achieving this endstate. History indicates the continuing trend towards decentralization and distribution of operations. Objective Force platoon leaders can expect to make decisions with greater consequence and less supervision than previous generations. The officer selection and development system must ensure that future lieutenants possess sufficient conceptual, tactical, technical and interpersonal skills, to make rapid and sound decisions in the contemporary operating environment. Researchers identified experience as critical to the development of intuitive decision-making.⁷⁴ The quality and quantity of experiences that officers receive during pre-commissioning and officer basic course determines their level of competence.

⁷² Gary Yukl, “Leadership Competencies Required for the New Army and Approaches for Developing Them,” *Out of the Box Leadership*, 268 and J. Pace Van Devender and James R. Barker, “Leadership and Decision Processing in Twenty-First-Century Technical Organizations,” *Out of the Box Leadership*, 103.

⁷³ U.S. Army White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force, 19-20.

⁷⁴ “The case for experience-based OPD is overwhelming. Subjective analysis finds that experience is the key element from which an individual derives his/her confidence and competence to perform.” In Stuart A. Beare, “Experience in Officer Professional Development: A Pillar in Peril,” *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, (Winter 2001-2002), 46. Also emphasized in Brian R. Reinwald, “Tactical Intuition,” *Military Review*, (September-October 2000), Internet, <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/SepOct00/rein.htm>, accessed 12 January 2002.

PART FOUR

CURRENT U.S. ARMY OFFICER ACCESSION

The current officer selection and development process attempts to meet requirements to fill all officer positions while providing sufficient training without interfering in the cadet's education. Increasingly complex operational environments and demand for greater decentralization of command and control demand that platoon leaders possess increased competence. The current U.S. Army officer selection and development process may not provide sufficient training experience to produce tactically competent leaders capable of meeting the demands of the Objective Force Concept. Pre-commissioning training programs, at the USMA and in various college Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) units, struggle to balance education and training. USMA and ROTC focus on producing sufficient numbers of second lieutenants to man the force with the potential of sacrificing quality. If the U.S. Army expects the accession system to meet the needs of transformation to the Objective Force, then the current system may require adaptation.

The U.S. Army obtains its officers from three primary sources: Officer Candidate School, ROTC and USMA. The ROTC and USMA lieutenant accessions remain predictable but inflexible given the four years that it takes cadets to matriculate. Therefore, OCS provides the army with the ability to increase or decrease officer accessions based upon the needs of the force.⁷⁵ OCS provides the U.S. Army flexibility because the course turns out officers in fourteen weeks. Currently, the three sources of officer commissions provide the following percentage of second lieutenants: OCS – 12%, ROTC – 50%, and USMA 12%.⁷⁶ The U.S. Army obtains the

⁷⁵ An example of this is demonstrated in a recent AUSA News article. "Army triples slots open to OCS at Benning," *AUSA News*, (5 March 2002), 11.

⁷⁶ Department of the Army, *College ROTC: The Way Ahead*, (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Cadet Command. Internet, <http://rotc.monroe.army.mil/cg/wayahead.doc>, Accessed 2 November 2001.

remainder of officer through direct commissions of professional skills such as medical doctors and attorneys.

Surprisingly, the U.S. Army does not centralize control over the three accession programs. ROTC answers to the Commander TRADOC as a Field Operating Agency (FOA). The USMA responds to the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel also as a FOA. The Commander U.S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia, a subordinate TRADOC organization, conducts the OCS program. This decentralized system allows each program to determine its own training agenda within the general outlines of *TRADOC Regulation 351-10 Institutional Leader Training and Education*.⁷⁷ Several U.S. Congressmen have identified the variations in the commissioning courses and questioned the logic behind the present accession programs that do not allow centralized control.⁷⁸ The varied states of pre-commissioning preparation manifest itself at the basic officer courses. One commander of a basic course company expressed concerns about the performance of Second Lieutenants during officer basic course.⁷⁹ Similarly, the *Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report* reiterated the need for improved and codified officer development programs.⁸⁰ The U.S. Army cannot control officer selection and development until it centralizes control of all pre-commissioning sources under one command.

⁷⁷ Regulation states "Precommissioning programs are varied yet complementary." Policy guidance is provided by AR 351-17 for the USMA and AR 145-1 (Senior Reserve Officers Training Corps Program: Organization, Administration, and Training) described in U.S. Department of the Army, *TRADOC Regulation 351-10, Schools – Institutional Leader Training and Education*, (Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, May 1997), 15. The different command structures found at the TRADOC Homepage Internet <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/sitemap.htm>, accessed 21 September 2001 and Army Portal <https://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/community.jhtml> ;

⁷⁸ Remarks by Representative Steve Buyer, Indiana, *Professional Military Education for the 21st Century Warrior - Conference Proceedings*, ed. Shelly A. Jones and Judy A. Daniel, (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1998).

⁷⁹ The former commander of an IOBC company cited the loss of ten officers for reasons he found unacceptable from graduates of either ROTC or the USMA (i.e. failing fitness test, declining to serve in the infantry, unwillingness to conduct hand to hand combat, pre-existing medical conditions that degraded their performance, etc.) Adam J. Schroeder, *Why the Army Needs to Revise its Officer Selection System*, (Paper towards Troy State MA, 2000), 8-9.

⁸⁰ U.S Department of the Army, *The ATLDP Officer Study*, 11.

One challenge facing both ROTC and USMA is balancing training and education requirements. John Lovell describes this tension in detail in the landmark 1979 book *Neither Athens Nor Sparta?*. He explains “The key dilemma remains that of reconciling the Athenian goals of a four-year undergraduate education program with the Spartan goals of military training and professional socialization.”⁸¹ The U.S. Army must consider that tactical leaders tend to rely more on training while senior army leaders rely upon greater educational experiences when balancing education and training.⁸² In order to achieve higher cadet retention, ROTC has reduced training emphasis during the academic year, transferred these training requirements to ROTC Advanced Camp, and left some training responsibilities to Officer Basic Courses (OBC).⁸³ Similarly, USMA adjusted the academic calendar so that all military related training occurs during specified mid-sessions not during the academic year.⁸⁴ Although ROTC and the USMA have decreased their training emphasis, the ROTC Ranger Challenge and USMA Sandhurst competitions, provide significant training opportunities for those cadets that volunteer for these events. Additionally, ROTC has recently contracted some ROTC instructor duties in order to manage decreased manning.⁸⁵ Overall, both USMA and ROTC appear to have promoted Athens at the expense of Sparta by shifting the training emphasis to OBC.

⁸¹ John P. Lovell, *Neither Athens Nor Sparta?*, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1979), 274.

⁸² Jeffrey D. McCausland and Gregg F. Martin, “Transforming Strategic Leader Education for the 21st-Century Army,” *Parameters*, U.S. Army War College Quarterly, (Autumn 2001), Internet, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01autumn/Mccausla.htm>, Accessed 5 September 2001.

⁸³ LTG (RET) David H. Ohle remarks that the “goals and objectives of those programs ought not be to produce lieutenants who are fully qualified.” Basic course and unit commanders can accomplish this as long as pre-commissioning produces trainable officers of character. Department of the Army, *Future Lieutenant*, (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Cadet Command). Internet, http://www.rotc.monroe.army.mil/netit/training/_lieutenantstudy/_futurelieutenan/futurelieutenan.doc, accessed 9 November 01. Also see *ROTC Future Lieutenant Study*. (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Cadet Command, 1999). Compare these remarks to those made by General Depuy. General DePuy concludes that ROTC needed to qualify graduates as squad leaders or vehicle commanders. In *Changing an Army, An Oral History of General William E. DePuy*, ed. Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mullen, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Military History Institute, 1979).

⁸⁴ Military Science Core Courses at Department of Military Instruction USMA Web Site, Internet <http://www.usma.edu/dmi/MS/CORE/Index.htm> accessed 12 November 2001.

⁸⁵ MPRI currently mans 330 Assistant Professor of Military Science positions at 220 universities by hiring retired military officers. Internet http://www.mpri.com/subchannels/nat_ROTCHtml, accessed 14 Mar 02.

In order to overcome the decreased level of training that a cadet receive at ROTC and USMA and to better synchronize the officer acculturation process, the U.S. Army established the Pilot Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) Phase I to centralize control over officer competencies and acculturation in a six-week course conducted at Fort Benning. In order to accomplish this, the BOLC Phase I (All Branches) focuses on mastery of basic technical and tactical skills rather than the development conceptual and interpersonal skills necessary for battlefield decision-making. Officers then attend branch specific BOLC Phase II but the length of BOLC Phase I and II has remained the same as previous branch basic courses.⁸⁶ Although BOLC serves a critical function as the military institutional education that provides a common frame of reference for all officers, the necessity of creating the course causes concern for how the three commissioning sources and branch basic officer courses develop officers.

The overarching concern for maintaining the capability to rapidly expand the U.S. Army inhibits the evolution of the officer accession system. U.S. Army personnel system expects pre-commission sources to produce the quantity of officers required for filling all vacant positions. Additionally, the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 shaped the accession system to achieve rapid mobilization.⁸⁷ Rapid mobilization was a critical issue in the post Second World War era because the U.S. faced the threat of Soviet invasion of Western Europe and because the U.S. had not been well prepared for mobilization before either the First or Second World Wars. Today, the U.S. Army's focus on maintaining the right quantity of officers could be causing quality to diminish. The result of the focus on production has led ROTC and USMA to de-emphasize training

⁸⁶ The Basic Officer Leader Course Welcome Packet, Internet, <http://www-benning.army.mil/BOLC/Welcome%20Packet/BOLCforweb/> , accessed 21 February 2002.

⁸⁷ National Defense Research Institute, Defense Manpower Research Center, *Future Career Management Systems for the U.S. Military Officers*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 2.

opportunities to enable greater cadet retention.⁸⁸ The training focus has shifted to preparing cadets for the next level of training at BOLC not service as platoon leaders. The U.S. Army should consider modifying the officer accession emphasis to provide soldiers and leaders for the transformation army.

The downsizing to the U.S. Army in the 1990s and increased operational tempo due to several operational deployments combined with the strong civilian economy led to high junior officer attrition.⁸⁹ High junior officer attrition and the U.S. Army's continued demand for mid-grade officers caused the U.S. Army to reduce the time in grade requirements for promotion from lieutenant to captain.⁹⁰ The downstream effect of this process resulted in lieutenants spending less time in critical platoon level leadership positions. Furthermore, Marin Leed, a research with RAND, identified the disturbing trend of decreasing tactical leadership experiences in junior U.S. Army officers.⁹¹ The declining competence of the tactical leadership prevents the U.S. Army from maximizing the benefits of decentralize control and distributed operations.

⁸⁸ *Future Lieutenant*, the study states that cadets should not "major in ROTC" and that tactical training should be shifted to summer camp and officer basic courses. Based on this shift in emphasis and the focus of the document on recruiting and retaining cadets I deduce that the purpose revolves around producing sufficient number of lieutenants. Department of the Army, *Future Lieutenant*, (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Cadet Command), Internet, http://www.rotc.monroe.army.mil/netit/training_/lieutenantstudy_/futurelieutenan/futurelieutenan.doc, Accessed 9 November 2001.

⁸⁹ Walter F. Ulmer, Jr. ed. *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century*, (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2000), 18-21.

⁹⁰ Snider and Watkins claim "The Army is now sufficiently short of captains that, to fill the ranks, it has reduced the time-in-grade for lieutenants to be promoted (thus exacerbating the 'tactical gap') and established a general-officer-led task force to assess leadership and training issues throughout the Army." Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins, "The Future of Army Professionalism: A Need and Redefinition," *Parameters*, *US Army War College Quarterly*, (Autumn 2000), Internet, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00autumn/snider.htm>, accessed 16 August 2001.

⁹¹ Leed states "The total amount of time that Armor platoon leaders spent in homestation field training in a given assignment was estimated to have fallen by almost half over this nine year period." The training time was not made up during operational deployments. Accordingly, Leed concludes "Our model indicates, therefore, that these officers would have lower levels of tactical expertise than had been the case in the early 1990's. By extension, they would be less adept at decision-making, face greater challenge in building strong leader/follower relationships, and derive less tactical benefit from subsequent opportunities than had earlier officers." Marin Leed, *Keeping the Warfighting Edge: An Empirical Analysis of Army Officers' Tactical Expertise Over the 1990's*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Graduate School, 2000), 78-80 and 98-99.

Unit performance at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) reveals the trend of declining competence among the U.S. Army's junior tactical leaders. Recent trends at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and National Training Center (NTC) reveal that experience among platoon leaders has declined. Observer Controllers from both JRTC and NTC believe that lack of platoon leader experience led to degraded unit performance.⁹² Quality leader selection and development could improve junior officer performance at the CTCs. Despite the decline in leader experience, the U.S. Army effectively conducted peacekeeping operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Although the officer accession system still produces effective leaders as demonstrated in the recent operations, the U.S. Army's effort to transform depends upon increased competence at the junior tactical officer level.

The U.S. Army also neglected the officer development program formally known as Military Qualification Standards (MQS). The MQS program originated in 1987 in order to provide focused officer development standards to meet the demands of AirLand Battle Doctrine.⁹³ The program focused officer development during operational assignments by defining required competencies. Even though the MQS program was far from perfect in execution, it provided a crucial element in defining standards for self-development. The failure to update MQS indicates the priority of effort directed towards officer development.

There are several warning signs that the current officer accession system has not adapted to meet the needs of the future U.S. Army. In recent years, both ROTC and USMA de-emphasized training opportunities during the pre-commissioning phase. In response, the U.S. Army modified the officer basic courses to finish training lieutenants, to centralize basic officer training and to

⁹² Bernard M. Bass and Bruce J. Avolio, *Platoon Readiness as a Function of Leadership, Platoon, and Company Cultures*. Technical Report 1104, (Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Aug 2000), 82. Authors personal experience during four years as an observer controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center during the time that the survey was conducted.

⁹³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Leader Development Study*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Leader Development Study Advisory Group, 1987), 25-26.

acculturate them into the army, as an officer corps not branch group.⁹⁴ The signposts of declining junior officer tactical competence have also manifested themselves at the Combat Training Centers. The authors of the report *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century* assess “Despite the centrality of leadership, the services have yet to master an optimal system for consistently identifying, promoting, and developing their best leaders. The primary challenge—today and in the future—is to better select and prepare leaders who can create effective organizational climates even in difficult times.”⁹⁵ The U.S. Army should consider adapting its officer accession programs in order to achieve the goals of decentralized control and distributed operations.

PART FIVE

ALTERNATIVE OFFICER ACCESSION PROGRAMS

The two principle methods of officer accession include vertical and horizontal accession. Each accession program seeks to acculturate civilians into the profession of arms as officers. Accordingly, the systems attempt to determine the suitability of candidates to succeed in officer commissioning programs. Under the vertical accession program, military forces either select their officers from amongst their non-commissioned officer and enlisted ranks or require officer candidates to serve as enlisted soldiers before commissioning. Alternatively, the horizontal program accesses officer candidates directly from civil society upon completion of high school, during college or after graduation. Armies that currently utilize the horizontal accession process include the United Kingdom and former Commonwealth nations, Russia and the United States. Armies that rely on the vertical accession process include Germany, Israel and Netherlands.

⁹⁴ BOLC was established based on recommendations from the *ATLDP Officer Study*. It was designed to overcome pre-commissioning training deficiencies (i.e. poor land navigation skills, limited marksmanship training, etc.). *ATLDP Officer Study*, 11. And, MAJ Adam Schoreoder, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 January 2002.

⁹⁵ Walter F. Ulmer, Jr. et al. *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century*, xxii.

Regardless of the accession program, only Russia and the United States require that officers possess undergraduate degrees.⁹⁶ Given the increasing competence demands challenging the current U.S. Army officer accession program, the U.S. Army should conduct a comparative analysis of the varied officer accession programs to determine options to adapt the current accession system.

HORIZONTAL ACCESSION

The U.S. Army and the British Army rely primarily upon the horizontal accession model to select officer candidates. The British send all officer candidates to the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst for the Commissioning Course. The majority of U.S. Army officer candidates attend either the college ROTC pre-commissioning programs or the USMA. The U.S. Army also uses the vertical accession model to select OCS cadets and lesser number of candidates for both ROTC and the USMA. The horizontal accession programs expect cadets to acculturate to military lifestyle while attending year or longer pre-commissioning programs that are separate and distinct from enlisted training.

U.S. Army: ROTC Programs and the USMA recruit most candidates from among the best-qualified high school students available. The selection criterion that the USMA applies includes: academic qualifications (both standardized college tests and high school record), medical qualifications, physical qualifications (including a Physical Aptitude Exam) and leadership (i.e. Student Leadership positions, Boy Scouts of America or church activities).⁹⁷ USMA candidates must also obtain a political nomination that normally requires an interview with a selection board

⁹⁶ National Defense Research Institute, Defense Manpower Research Center, *Future Career Management Systems for the U.S. Military Officers*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 113.

⁹⁷ USMA Admissions, Basic Requirements, Internet: <http://www.usma.edu/admission/step1.asp> , Accessed: 9 November 2001.

that is determined by each nominating authority (Congressional or Service Connected).⁹⁸

Congressman Steve Buyer of Indiana stated that he directed his academy nominating committees to select individuals based upon well-rounded distinguished performance.⁹⁹ ROTC scholarship candidates go through a similar process. Criterion that ROTC considered includes results of standard college tests, high school academic achievement, school official evaluations, extracurricular participation and personal interview. ROTC Cadet Command tasks each college's Professor of Military Science (PMS) to conduct the personal interviews that assess the quality of candidates.¹⁰⁰ Non-scholarship ROTC candidates go through a less rigorous selection process. The USMA and ROTC each rely heavily on interview assessment boards to select potential candidates. The assessment boards make this critical judgment based upon the strength of the candidate's file and a short interview. With limited contact time, the U.S. Army expects the selection committees to choose the future leadership of the force. The civilians and officers on these committees must assess candidate's leadership potential with no first hand knowledge of the individual.

Several tools exist to assist committees in determining candidate's suitability for careers as military officers. Surprisingly, the candidates do not take any psychological battery tests to determine leadership potential. Law enforcement agencies, Special Operations Forces, and Drill Instructors candidate school now commonly employ test such as the Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator and Personality Characteristics Inventory to ensure that individuals have personality and behavioral traits desirable for particular missions.¹⁰¹ ROTC and the USMA each accept candidates based upon the nominating or personal interview boards' recommendation that chosen

⁹⁸ USMA Admissions, Apply for Nomination, Internet: <http://www.usma.edu/admission/step2.asp> , Accessed: 9 November 2001.

⁹⁹ Remarks by Representative Steve Buyer, Indiana, *Professional Military Education for the 21st Century Warrior - Conference Proceedings*, ed. Shelly A. Jones and Judy A. Daniel, (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1998).

¹⁰⁰ U.S. Army, Cadet Command Headquarters, Internet: <http://www-rotc.monroe.army.mil/scholarships/fouryear/criteria.htm>, accessed: 5 January 2002.

¹⁰¹ Schroeder, *Why the Army Needs to Revise its Officer Selection System*, 10-12.

candidates will accept the U.S. Army culture.¹⁰² Assuming similarity between cadet and U.S. Army culture, these four-year programs allow time for both cadets to accept the Army Culture and for academy and ROTC staff to assess the cadet's acceptance of the Army Culture.¹⁰³ Although ROTC and the USMA balance education and military training, the cadets face exposure to Army Values over extended periods of primarily academic focus and shorter periods of military specific training. The challenge facing the USMA and ROTC remains balancing the bureaucratic demands for meeting officer commissioning goals and military professional goal of graduating the officers with sufficient expertise to be effective leaders.

British Army: The British Army officer accession system differs significantly from the U.S. Army system. Many officer candidates first seek sponsorship from specific regiments during the application process. This allows regimental officer input into the accession program with potential for greater individual assessment. Similar to the U.S. Army, the British specify selection criterion such as academic credentials and medical examinations. The British Army does not require officer candidates with strong high school grades to possess undergraduate degrees but they do offer several Army Scholarship programs to fund undergraduate education. After this screening, the British Army conducts a rigorous selection process.

The British Army establishes a Regular Commissions Board (RCB) to conduct officer assessment and selection. The RCB conducts a three-day test and evaluation during which candidates are assessed on "intellectual, practical and leadership potential."¹⁰⁴ The candidates participate in leadership reaction courses, interviews that test candidate's intellectual skills, psychological interviews, and fitness tests. Once selected, all officer candidates attend the forty-

¹⁰² The USMA has attempted to shift the emphasis away from the Cadet Fourth Class system rites of passage to a more professional focus of cadets as future officers. *American Military Culture* has one of the best description of military culture. The authors accept the following definition of culture: "According to James Burk, the four essential elements of military culture are discipline, professional ethos, ceremony and etiquette, and cohesion and esprit de corps." Walter F. Ulmer, Jr. et al. *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century*, 8-11

¹⁰³ NDRI, *Future Career Management Systems for the U.S. Military Officers*, 84.

¹⁰⁴ Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Selection, Stage 6 - Regular Commissions Board, Internet: <http://www.armyofficer.co.uk/selection.asp> , accessed: 15 January 2002.

four week Commissioning Course at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. The Commissioning Course at Sandhurst focuses on military training, leadership, physical fitness, adventure training and academic instruction.¹⁰⁵ Sandhurst focuses nearly exclusively on military training except for specific military theory and history that may be useful for commissioned officers.

Summary: Although the British and U.S. Army employ different selection procedures, both armies expect officer candidates to acculturate over long periods. In each process, cadets face one to four year immersion in military culture that determines suitability for commissioning as officers. The degree of immersion in the military culture defines the primary difference in the commissioning programs. Sandhurst cadets face nearly a year of total immersion in military training with breaks for adventure training. West Point cadets, as well as other similar military college cadets, must rapidly acculturate during the six-week Cadet Basic Training and Plebe Year but then find increasing liberties during the remaining years at the USMA. ROTC cadets gradually immerse in military culture during the academic year, and face greater acculturation while attending various U.S. Army training and ROTC Advanced Camp. The separate officer acculturation process distinguishes the British and U.S. horizontal accession from the Israeli and German vertical accession. Furthermore, institutional experiences provide most of the British and U.S. initial army officer cultural exposure.

VERTICAL ACCESSION

The German Army and Israeli Defense Force (IDF) use vertical accession to select officer candidates. This process allows these military forces to ascertain an officer candidate's leadership potential before the candidate beginnings pre-commissioning training. The German

¹⁰⁵ See details at Sandhurst Dairy, Background Training at Internet: <http://www.army.mod.uk/sandhurst/> , accessed: 15 January 2002.

Army and IDF also expect their officers to experience the same acculturation process as their enlisted soldiers. The German and Israeli officer candidates receive exposure to military culture in both institutional and operational experiences.

IDF: The IDF uses a general classification test and psychological test to determine the leadership potential of all conscripts. After serving several months as enlisted soldiers, the IDF assess potential leaders from available conscripts. Reuven Gal describes the process in the book *A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier*: “Based on initial quality scores (Kaba), immediate commanders' evaluations, and their sociametric scores, candidates from each specific basic training course are selected for their respective junior command courses.”¹⁰⁶ After serving approximately six months in operational assignments, candidates attend the four to seven month junior command course. The course focuses on branch specific combat leadership and has been compared to U.S. Army Ranger School. Many Israelis consider it the toughest leadership course in the IDF.¹⁰⁷ Graduates then serve in operational non-commissioned officers positions. The IDF selects officer candidates from among the volunteering non-commissioned officers. The experience, tactical knowledge and technical skills that officer candidates possess before they attend the officer course allows the IDF to focus effort on leadership skills and tactical decision-making.¹⁰⁸ The commander's input significantly distinguishes the IDF officer selection process from the British and U.S. accession programs. In this regard, the U.S. Army OCS selection process resembles the IDF accession process.

German Army: The German Army also requires its officer candidates to serve as enlisted soldiers. However, most German officer candidates enter the army as contracted officer cadets. Thus, the Germans do not select their officers in the same manner as the IDF. The German

¹⁰⁶ Reuven Gal, *A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 91. Also described by LTC Eytan Yitshak, Israeli Army, Combat Engineer and former Battalion Commander, presently student officer CGSOC, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 February 2002.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 117.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 119.

officer candidate attends basic training with conscripted soldiers and serves his first six months as an enlisted soldier. Officer candidates then attend the initial officer-training course that result in promotion to the rank of cadet non-commissioned officer. In this position, officer candidates receive operational experience as first line leaders for six to nine months. Finally, officer candidates attend the advanced officer-training course and receive promotion to lieutenant upon graduation. The German Army assigns lieutenants initially as platoon leaders for approximately one year.¹⁰⁹ Upon completion of one-year operational assignment as platoon leader, German officers attend one of the two military universities (*Bundeswehrhochschulen*) for three years of focused academics before returning to the operational army as platoon leaders. Although the Germans select most of their officer cadets prior to acculturation, the combination of institutional and operational assignments allow German commanding officers significant input into the selection of cadets for continued training and promotion to officer rank.

Summary: The role of commanding officers in operational assignments and acculturation as enlisted soldiers distinguishes the vertical accession process from the horizontal process. Given that German and IDF officer candidates serve as leaders in operational assignments before gaining commissions, allows commanding officers greater influence over officer candidate selection and development. German and IDF commanders have a large stake in selecting and developing high quality officer candidates because these officer candidates return to the units of origin after completing training. Furthermore, vertical accession allows officers to develop greater empathy with their soldiers due to shared personal experiences as enlisted soldiers. This provides the German and IDF officer's enhanced creditability with their soldiers. In *Leadership:*

¹⁰⁹ German companies use NCO as platoon leaders in two of the platoons and an officer in the third. The platoon leaders must perform as peers with the NCOs during these assignments. The peer relationships strengths officer and NCO bonds and encourages rapid officer development. LTC Joerge K.W. Vollmer, German Army, Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship, SAMS, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 January 2002. Other details are available at the Bundeswehr Homepage, Recruitment, Internet: http://www.bundeswehr.de/news/english/6_2_recruitment.html , accessed, 9 September 2001. Remarkably, the German officer training remains largely unchanged from the interwar period described by James S. Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg*, 77-84

The Warrior's Art, Kevin Farrell explains the significance of high German officer competence in the Second World War “Because of the training it took to become an officer, junior officers were well accustomed to army life and conduct in the field, and had experience serving in leadership positions...Inexperienced second lieutenants simply did not exist.”¹¹⁰ The different officer accession programs all aim to achieve the same goal of developing competent leaders of character. The U.S. Army should consider all accession systems while attempting to adapt institutional and operational procedures for selecting and developing tactical leaders.

PART SIX

PROPOSED OFFICER SELECTION AND DEVELOPMENT

The U.S. Army faces the challenge to update the existing officer selection and development process. *The Army Training and Leader Developmental Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study* highlights the shortcomings in the present selection and development system¹¹¹. Meanwhile, the Objective Force Concept White Paper explains “The non-contiguous battlespace places increased emphasis on initiative, agility, judgment, and tactical and technical competence of skilled leaders of all levels.”¹¹² The present accession system focuses greater attention on fulfilling manning requirements than providing new officers mastery of professional expert knowledge. Platoon leaders graduate from their officer basic courses with minimal experience in performing tactical tasks in an operational environment. The U.S. Army recognized these problems and the *ATLDP*

¹¹⁰ Kevin W. Farrell, “Culture of Confidence: The Tactical Excellence of the German Army of the Second World War”, ed. Christopher Kolena, *Leadership: The Warrior's Art*, (Carlisle, PA: The Army War College Foundation Press, 2001), 191.

¹¹¹ The *ATLDP Officer Study* provides several examples of inadequacies in the current officer selection and development process. “Junior officers are not receiving adequate leader development experiences.” “Officers are concerned that the officer education system (OES) does not provide them the skills for success in full spectrum operations.” “The Army assignments system is driven by requirements to fill spaces rather than quality leader development.” “OES does not satisfactorily train officers in combined arms skills or support the bonding, cohesion, and rapid teaming required in full spectrum operations.” U.S. Department of the Army, *ATLDP Officer Study*, 2.

¹¹² U.S. Department of the Army, *White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force*, 11.

Officer Study recommended creating the Pilot BOLC. The panel advises: “This course focuses on establishing a common Army standard for small unit fighting and leadership; teaching common platoon leader skills and Officership; providing opportunities for hands-on, performance-oriented field training; and providing opportunities for lieutenants to train with NCOs and captains as a part of a combined arms team conducting full spectrum operations.”¹¹³ In order to meet all these goals, BOLC probably requires more than the six weeks currently provided for BOLC Phase I training.

The six-week long BOLC Phase I and follow on Phase II branch specific basic courses (ten additional weeks for infantry lieutenants) does not allow sufficient time to achieve all these goals. Instead, the courses must focus on fundamental tactical and technical skills that officers could have mastered in pre-commissioning programs. By comparison, the British, German and Israel officer accession programs dedicate more training time to the development of tactical competencies. These officer accession programs focus more on conceptual and interpersonal decision-making skills because the officers have mastered technical and tactical skill before arriving at their branch specific basic officer training courses. The U.S. Army should consider adapting the current accession process to better screen officer candidates and to better prepare officers for tactical leadership positions.

The established criteria to assess or measure the effectiveness of developing competence should focus on leader skills: technical, tactical, conceptual and interpersonal. There is no current test to measure leader competence for graduates of various officer development programs. Such a test is beyond the scope and focus of this paper and requires an extensive study by the U.S. Army Research Institute or similar organization. There are also no means to assess the quality of leader experiences. Quantity of training weeks does not necessarily equate to quality. However, alternative officer training programs of professional armies are not likely to conduct low quality

¹¹³ Officer Education System Recommendations. U.S. Department of the Army, *ATLDP Officer Study*, 12-13.

training as these different forces take military effectiveness quite seriously. Both history and theory demonstrate the critical role that experience plays as a critical role in enabling competence. Although experience does not equal competence, experience is a critical component of competence. Significantly, there is no expeditious way to develop meaningful experience. Therefore, quantity of training is important because it provides more experience and improved competence. This study assumes that the effectiveness of officer development programs corresponds to the number of weeks spent in training. For example, nearly the entire forty-four week Sandhurst program and follow-on branch specific courses (sixteen weeks for infantry) emphasize military training.¹¹⁴ Likewise, the German and Israeli officers attend nearly a year's worth of training interspersed with two to three years' operational experiences before commissioning. This equates to between seventy and ninety six weeks of training for German and Israeli officers.¹¹⁵ When the training weeks available to British, German and Israeli officers are compared as in Fig. 1, the quantitative differences emerge. The U.S. Army officers receive nine to fourteen weeks less training than their counterparts. Compared to several foreign officer training programs, U.S. Army officers have significantly less training or operational experiences.

¹¹⁴ See details at Sandhurst Dairy, Background Training at Internet: <http://www.army.mod.uk/sandhurst/>, Accessed: 15 January 2002.

¹¹⁵ The IDF commissions officers at approximately the two-year mark. The German officers are commissioned along a similar timeline so that they have completed one year as a platoon leader before reaching their third year in service. During this period, Israeli and German officers complete seventy to ninety six weeks of training or operational experiences before commissioning. LTC Eytan Yitshak, Israeli Army, Combat Engineer and former Battalion Commander, presently student officer CGSOC, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 February 2002 and Reuven Gal, *A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 91. Also see Ze'ev Schiff, *A History of The Israeli Army 1874 To The Present*, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1985), 107, and Martin Van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force*, (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 116-117. And, Bundeswehr Homepage, Recruitment.




Fig. 1. Foreign Officer Training Compared to ROTC and USMA

ROTC Cadets complete twenty-four weeks of military training including Advanced Camp and required ROTC school training events. After Advanced Camp, ROTC Cadets may also gain three weeks of Cadet Troop Leading Experience (CTLT) in operational units as well as attend any of a number of U.S. Army training courses (Individual Army Training [IAT]: i.e. Airborne or Air Assault School) that last an average of three weeks. Therefore, ROTC graduates may have between twenty-two and thirty-six weeks training before attending the officer basic course (see Fig. 2).¹¹⁶ If attending the Infantry Basic Course, an officer receives another sixteen weeks of training. In sum, combat arms officers from ROTC average forty-five weeks of training.

¹¹⁶ Training week information discerned from Annex C and D in U.S. Department of the Army, Cadet Command Regulation 145-3 *Reserve Officers' Training Corps Precommissioning Training and Leadership Development*, (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Cadet Command), Internet, http://www.rotc.monroe.army.mil/netit/training_/1453/, accessed 9 November 2001.




Fig. 2. ROTC Training Opportunities

USMA Cadets receive similar training experiences as ROTC Cadets. USMA Cadets undergo six weeks training in Cadet Basic Training (CBT) their first year and six weeks training in Cadet Field Training (CFT) their second year. During each academic year, cadets attend one two-week military intercession. Similar to ROTC, USMA Cadets spend five weeks with U.S. Army units in either the CTLT or the Drill Cadet Training Program. Cadets may also receive one or two opportunities to attend an IAT. Finally, cadets serve as cadre for either the CBT or CFT programs. In total, USMA cadets may receive thirty to forty one weeks of training depending on the number of schools attended and subject to counting the CBT or CFT cadre experiences as training.¹¹⁷ If an USMA officer attended the sixteen week Infantry Officer Basic Course, he would have an average of fifty-two weeks of training when he graduated.

¹¹⁷ USMA Cadet leadership experiences were not considered in these calculations. Argument could be made that these experience should be considered but I did not equate cadet garrison leader experiences with training or operational experiences. USMA Department of Military Instruction web page Internet <http://www.usma.edu/dmi> , Accessed 9 November 2001




Fig 3. USMA Training Opportunities

In comparison to British, German and Israeli competence, the average U.S. Army officer completes anywhere from eight to fourteen weeks less training than any other officer-training program. Given the immersion and compression of the year long military training for the British officer or the training and operational experiences of the German and Israeli officers, U.S. Army officers arrive at their basic courses with less experience than their foreign counterparts. Therefore, U.S. Army basic courses must focus on completing technical and tactical training with little time left to develop conceptual and interpersonal decision-making skills. The British, German and Israeli officers arrive at their branch specific courses having more sound foundations in tactical and technical skills, therefore these basic courses focus greater effort towards decision-making and conceptual skills. British officers' hold their Sandhurst training in very high regard and believe that it is one of the great strengths of the British Army.¹¹⁸ These officers felt they had sufficient competence to lead platoons upon graduation. German officers have sufficient

¹¹⁸ Captain Jamie Loden, Parachute Regiment, Exchange Officer with the 82nd Airborne Division, interview by author, Fort Stewart, GA, 25 January 2002. And, Major Nicholas P. F. Bercham, Kings Royal Hussars, student Advanced Military Studies Program, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, 26 February 2002.

experience that their company commanders expect them to perform as well as the two peer non-commissioned officer platoon leaders in each company.¹¹⁹ Israeli officers frequently have the most experience and competence of any man in their platoon.¹²⁰ Increasing training opportunities during officer commissioning and pre-commissioning builds the competence and confidence required to execute Objective Force operations. Focusing more attention on developing competence early establishes a sound foundation for mastering professional expert knowledge.

The U.S. Army has several options to choose from in order to adapt the current accession system. Available options that provide increased training and experiences to the officer selection and development process include Assessment and Selection Boards, Enlisted Service Prior to Pre-Commissioning, Unit Level Deployment Work-Ups, Extended Basic Officer Training Course, and the USMA as the U.S. Army Commissioning Source. The U.S. Army should consider adopting one of these courses of action or a combination of the presented courses of action in order to fulfill the leadership requirements of future tactical leaders.

ASSESSMENT AND SELECTION BOARDS

Model: One distinguishing feature of the U.S. Army's officer accession process is the absence of an assessment and selection board. The assessment and selection board process could allow the U.S. Army to identify early those most suited for careers as military officers. The British Regular Commissions Board (RCB) serves as a model for the U.S. Army to follow. The board could be conducted over a three to five day period and include medical exams, fitness tests, intelligence testing, psychological testing, leadership reaction course evaluations, interviews and

¹¹⁹ German companies use NCO as platoon leaders in two of the platoons and an officer in the third. The platoon leaders must perform as peers with the NCOs during these assignments. The peer relationships strengthens officer and NCO bonds and encourages rapid officer development. LTC Joerge K.W. Vollmer, interview by author.

¹²⁰ Ze'ev Schiff, *A History of The Israeli Army 1874 To The Present*, 107, and Martin Van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force*, 116-117.

social interaction observation. In many ways, the assessment and selection process would resemble the existing U.S. Army Special Forces Assessment and Selection process. Given that the Regular U.S. Army currently accesses less than four thousand new officers each year, assessment and selection boards could reasonably meet and select appropriate candidates to fulfill the accession requirement.¹²¹ The board process would ensure that officer candidates possess the physical, mental and psychological aptitude required to serve as an officer in the U.S. Army.

Advantages: The U.S. Army stands to gain several advantages if choosing to implement a selection and assessment board. The assessment board identifies those best suited for service as officers. Qualities that the U.S. Army desires include intelligence, physical fitness, socially adaptation, and leadership potential. Although candidates probably have limited technical and tactical skills, some assessment may be possible of interpersonal and conceptual skills. The assessment process also allows the U.S. Army to match officer candidates to particular branches based upon their assessment qualities that fit into particular branches.¹²² Additionally, the boarding process allows the U.S. Army to focus resources on those candidates most likely to succeed in officer training.

Disadvantages: There are also disadvantages encountered with an assessment board program. The process consumes additional resources in order to conduct the assessment. The assessment board may discourage individuals from applying to ROTC or USMA. The process also disrupts the status of the current system in an effort to synchronize ROTC and USMA selection processes.

Effectiveness: Based upon the effectiveness on the British RCB and U.S. Army Special Forces Assessment and Selection, the U.S. Army would likely improve the quality of cadets accessed into OCS, ROTC and the USMA by implementing a three to five day selection and

¹²¹ The U.S. Army current accesses 5% of the 75,105 officer population each year. This number is approximately 3755 new officers annually. Figures obtained from the Officer Professional Management Division's Briefing given by BG Dorian T. Anderson, Internet: <http://www.perscom.army.mil/opmd/newmission.htm>, accessed 18 February 2002.

¹²² Stephen J. Zaccaro, et al. *The Changing U.S. Army: A Summary of Future Focused Reports from 1990-1999*, (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute, October 1999), B-23.

accession board process. The assessment board fits best with the option to require enlisted service before commissioning or the option to develop an Officer Commissioning Course at the USMA.

ENLISTED SERVICE PRIOR TO PRE-COMMISSIONING COURSE

Model: The U.S. Army has the option to move from the horizontal accession process to the vertical accession process utilized by the German and Israeli Defense Forces. As with the German and Israeli officers, this option provides for significant training and operational experiences for all officer candidates. The most significant factor in this option is determining the correct level of training and appropriate experiences required for future officers. This process also allows prospective officer candidates to assimilate into the 'Army Culture' before undergoing an officer assessment and selection board.

Advantages: According to this model, the U.S. Army would require all prospective officer candidates to serve as enlisted soldiers before commissioning in order to provide these candidates greater practical interpersonal, technical and tactical experiences. By serving as enlisted soldiers and non-commissioned officers, officer candidates gain basic tactical skills such as land navigation; troop leading procedures and battle drills. Candidates also learn technical skills associated with weapons, computers, vehicles and radios. Under the mentorship of non-commissioned officers, candidates learn direct leadership skills. Interpersonal skills develop as candidates observe leaders issuing orders and supervising task execution and when candidates assume leadership roles and perform troop-leading tasks. The Germans and Israelis employ this process because it allows leaders to develop all the skills of their subordinates and it identifies those candidates that are not suitable for filling leader positions. Officers first learn how to be followers before they are charged to lead soldiers. The vertical accession process improves leader skills: technical, tactical, conceptual and interpersonal.

Significantly, the several studies found that vertical accession improves officer retention. Currently, OCS graduates have higher retention rates than either ROTC or USMA.¹²³ Several factors play in the outcome of retention rate surveys. Most significantly, the OCS graduates generally acculturate into the army before attending OCS and they have greater incentive to remain on active duty until retirement age since they already have several years in the service. The U.S. Army should analyze how OCS achieves greater retention so that ROTC and USMA can seek to improve officer retention rates.

Competent small unit leadership allows higher headquarters to decentralize control with confidence that the subordinate unit can accomplish its assigned mission. OCS graduates frequently mature and experience officers to the U.S. Army thereby providing their peers role models for tactical and technical expertise.¹²⁴ This facilitates battalion or brigade commander's ability to perform distributed operations down to the platoon level because of increased competence below company level.

The vertical accession program also depends upon company and battalion commander involvement in selection and development of officer candidates. Fortunately, these commanders knowing that these officer candidates may later serve in their units would likely participate actively in the developmental process. This process empowers those officers who know the officer candidate personally to help select the future leaders of the U.S. Army. The enlisted service option may also replace a centralized assessment and selection process with a local command focused program. Once cadets arrived at ROTC and USMA, these programs could focus more training time on developing advanced tactical and conceptual decision-making skills.

¹²³ The survey cites the following attrition rates for Year Groups 90-93: USMA – 35%, ROTC not DMG – 25%, ROTC DMG – 18% and OCS – 7%. U.S. Department of the Army, *Analysis of Year Group 90-93 Active Component Captain Voluntary Attrition Patterns*, Alexandria, VA: U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, October 1999), slides “Who is Getting Out” and “Who is Staying In”.

¹²⁴ An excellent study on the status of OCS was prepared by a former commander of the school while he was at the War College. He also cited the cost effectiveness of OCS graduates. Scott L. Armbrister, *Officer Candidate (OCS): Relevance into the 21st Century*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 1999), 15.

Disadvantages: The vertical accession model presents some challenges to overcome before committing to this option. Most U.S. Army officers currently accessed through OCS tend to be older than their ROTC and USMA counterparts are limiting service time as officers. Therefore, the U.S. Army must thoroughly analyze OCS officer experiences to determine the optimal training level and experiences for enlisted service. Some OCS graduate must also find time to complete their undergraduate degree programs. The potential exists for vertical accession to result in degraded average officer education levels as fewer candidates seeking college education may avoid the army to obtain their undergraduate degree immediately after finishing high school. Assuming ROTC and the USMA continue unchanged in this option, vertical accession delay entry into these pre-commissioning programs. If officer candidates were required to serve more than three years, the program could discourage candidates from applying to ROTC or USMA. Additionally, many candidates may not choose to become officers if they have married and started families and cannot attend the USMA or find ROTC too great a hardship. Like the Germans and Israelis, the U.S. Army would need to access officer candidates within three years or lose some portion of the available pool of soldiers.

Effectiveness: If the U.S. Army followed the German model, officer candidates would spend no more than a year in Initial Entry Training (IET) and operational assignments before attending additional leader training courses. One year would not significantly delay the education of future officers and would provide minimal acculturation. In this way, officer candidates would gain some military experience with minimal loss of interest in either ROTC or USMA. The OCS program remains to provide opportunities for more senior soldiers to become officers. Additionally, cadets would now be able to spend more time on mastering tactical and technical skills necessary for officer assignments rather than creating their own unique IET experiences. Between the IET and operational assignment, candidates found not suitable for service as officers could be discharged without prejudice or choose to serve as enlisted soldiers. The Enlisted Service before Commissioning Option provides modest gains in experience with minimal cost or

changes to the existing officer accession process. Enlisted service provides opportunities to master technical and minor tactical skills that would no longer be taught at ROTC or USMA. This allows ROTC and USMA to focus most training on developing tactical decision-making, conceptual skills and interpersonal skills.

UNIT LEVEL DEPLOYMENT WORK-UPS

Model: Modifying the current U.S. Army unit readiness program creates another alternative in officer development. If the U.S. Army followed a rotational readiness cycle similar to the system that the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) employs, units could take on most of the responsibility for training and developing officers in respective units.¹²⁵ Unit commanders gain more influence in tailoring the development of their officers to meet the needs of their units, but the units must also dedicate additional time and resources towards training their officers. Development already occurs when new officers arrive in their units but this program would attempt to formalize the process. TRADOC as a part of this proposal would publish training requirements and revised self-development programs like that conducted as a part of Military Qualifications Standards program.

The U.S. Army remains the only service not conducting a cyclic readiness program. Currently, the USMC conducts unit pre-deployment work-ups before deploying Marine Expeditionary Units. The U.S. Navy conducts similar training cycles with its deployed ships and submarines. The U.S. Air Force also trains in a similar fashion to provide Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF). Unlike all other services, the U.S. Army attempts to maintain all units in a ready for deployment posture. Changing the U.S. Army readiness program to rotational readiness posture allows units to focus greater training resources at leader development in a building block

¹²⁵ The USMC uses a fifteen-month cycle to train, qualify and deploy a task organized Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Special Operations Capable (SOC). The MEU(SOC) spends about twenty-six weeks preparing and training for an operational deployments. Described in Tom Clancy, *Marine: A Guided Tour of a Marine Expeditionary Unit*, (New York: Berkley Books, 1996), 246-249.

approach to readiness.

Advantages: This proposal places the onus of junior officer training and development upon the operational units. Battalion commanders assume responsibility to manage officer training to ensure that junior leaders complete required field tasks as a part of deployment certification. U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and TRADOC retain responsible for developing the mission training plans as well as the required training events (i.e. platoon Live Fire Exercise, platoon Situational Training Exercises, and planning and executing training and ranges). Battalion commanders could also manage a lieutenant probationary period and determine if officers have met all requirements to serve beyond the probationary period. During the probation, the battalion commander determines if the officer's suitability for further military service.

The unit level deployment work-up programs allows the greatest potential to improve leader competencies at the tactical level. The unit level deployment work up relies primarily upon company and battalion leadership for quality development of officers. The model also supports the concept of moving towards a "Train, Alert, Deploy" cycle rather than the current "Alert, Train, Deploy."¹²⁶ Theoretically, the process ensures that all lieutenants receive the same type of initial operational experiences while completing standardized operational readiness training followed by operational deployments or training exercises. Lieutenants gain from the opportunity to lead their platoons through a rigorous training cycle. However, platoon leader experiences may vary significantly depending upon the missions that the unit trains to execute.

Disadvantages: The challenge facing the U.S. Army with this proposal occurs if different units develop different standards of training based upon the unit's missions and commander's preferences. The unit level development also requires that branches assign personnel in pulses to units during the start of pre-deployment training. Unit level deployment work up assumes no changes in pre-commissioning program but requires a monumental shift in how the U.S. Army

¹²⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, *White Paper: Concepts for the Objective Force*, 12.

determines readiness and how units prepare for future missions. The development process may not provide a common experience for all leaders since some units may be preparing for peacekeeping while other units train on their wartime tasks.

Effectiveness: Battalion and Company Commander heavy involvement in the developmental process represents the greatest advantage of the probationary and work-up model. Officers participate in approximately twenty-six weeks of high intensity training with the full resources required to train a unit for an operational mission (see fig. 4). Unfortunately, the model does not support rapid deployment of multiple U.S. Army units since only one-third of all units would be available for immediate deployment. Additionally, the U.S. Army currently has too many different types of divisions and too many brigades committed to on-going operations to support this option. Therefore, the option is presently unfeasible but the Objective Force may find this option feasible and desirable.

EXTEND BASIC OFFICER TRAINING COURSE

Model: Extending the length of basic officer training course provides a third means to improve officer competence in tactical operations. Currently, the Pilot Phase I Basic Officer Leader Course trains for only six weeks. By comparison, the USMC Officer Basic School training occurs over twenty-six weeks.¹²⁷ The Basic School allows more time to develop leader competence because the USMC dedicates the time and resources to the priority mission of developing future leaders. Expanding Phase I BOLC by at least four weeks allows the course to conduct more situational training exercises that develop conceptual and tactical decision-making skills. The greater time also permits the course to move from squad level tactics to platoon level. Additionally, returning the Phase II BOLC branch specific course to their previous lengths (sixteen weeks for infantry) allows lieutenants opportunities to develop increased competence.

¹²⁷ USMC Basic School Homepage, Internet <https://www.tbs.usmc.mil>, accessed 23 February 2002.

Given these proposed extensions in training, infantry officers receive a total of twenty-six weeks of training compared to sixteen. These ten additional weeks of training raises the average training experiences for U.S. Army officers to the nearest foreign officer selection and development program, the British training model. Extending the courses enhances the U.S. Army's effort to centralized control over all officer basic training and further integrates all branches to provide a common understanding of the officer's role in the military profession.

Advantages: During the BOLC Phase I (common basic course), officers could master all applicable tactical and technical skills thereby allowing the BOLC Phase II (branch specific courses) to focus more attention on conceptual and decision-making capabilities. The single point for officer training allows better development and enforcement of training specific tasks. The intermixing of branches provides opportunities for officers to form professional relationships that would serve them in subsequent assignments. BOLC also achieves its desired goal of providing a common indoctrination experience to all officers through training and military social experiences.¹²⁸

Disadvantages: Extending BOLC causes delay in providing officers for the army. The U.S. Army would suffer some officer shortages during the first year of implementation. In order to accomplish all these tasks, the BOLC would require greater resources and possibly more facilities to house greater officer populations. The extended officer training also places greater demands upon Fort Benning, current location of BOLC Phase I, and TRADOC. Fort Benning may require expansion of temporary billeting and additional training facilities. The extended course requires

¹²⁸ BOLC High Payoff Events: 360 Degree Feedback, Squad and Patrolling STX, Leadership situational exercises, weapons mastery, fear mastery, MOUT and Informal socials and dining-in, part of the BOLC Welcome Briefing, Internet <http://www-benning.army.mil/BOLC> , accessed 21 February 2002.

more instructors to allow small group instruction that maximizes student learning.¹²⁹

Additionally, the increase in the U.S. Army's Training, Transient, Hold and Schools (TTHS) accounts counts against the army end strength without benefit to the force. Increasing the training at BOLC may encourage ROTC and USMA to further decrease training. The U.S. Army overcomes most of the challenges created by lengthening BOLC by committing more resources in terms of budget and personnel to significantly enhancing officer professional development.

Effectiveness: Adding ten more weeks to the two-phase Officer Basic Course allows second lieutenants to develop much better competence (see fig. 4). During this time, officers could master basic technical and tactical skills and begin development of conceptual and interpersonal skills. During the branch specific training, officers focus on developing conceptual and interpersonal skills that allow leaders to make rapid and sound decisions. The U.S. Army officer development program closes the training gap with other country's officer training programs. In many regards, the extended basic officer training would resemble a shortened version of the Sandhurst program. As such, then logic may argue for reorganization of OCS, ROTC and the USMA into a single point-commissioning source.

USMA AS THE U.S. ARMY COMMISSIONING SOURCE

Model: The most aggressive selection and development proposal calls for reorganization of OCS, ROTC and USMA. In *Neither Sparta nor Athens*, John Lovell recommends that USMA become the single point U.S. Army officer-commissioning source. One of his suggestions calls

¹²⁹ Fort Benning currently has one battalion dedicated to the officer basic course (2/11 Infantry Regiment). Creating another battalion specifically for BOLC Phase I provides sufficient staff for the lengthened BOLC. "IOBC Companies consists of a Company headquarters and four (4) to five (5) Platoons (with one each CPT, SFC, SSG). The Company size ranges from 160 to a maximum of 200. The maximum number of Lieutenants per Platoon is forty (40)." Fort Benning moved the 75th Ranger Regiment to new barracks facilities and has begun placing the BOLC students in these transient barracks with enough space to house the estimated 6000 officers (regular and reserve) training each year at BOLC, Internet <http://www-benning.army.mil/11th/2-11INF/index.htm> , accessed 21 February 2002.

for “Mixed Civilian – Military Collegiate Experience”.¹³⁰ Under this proposal, cadets would attend one of several civilian universities for three years followed by two years at a central commissioning source that would also grant an undergraduate degree. Another scenario he offers is “The Academies as Postgraduate Institutions”.¹³¹ Where much like medical or law school, candidates attend the military academy during a postgraduate career preparation phase. Under this scenario, the military academy emphasizes training and military specific education in a one or two-year program. The USMA Commissioning Course delivers a focused expert knowledge curriculum that initiates cadets into the profession of arms.

Advantages: The USMA commissioning course offers the U.S. Army homogeneous officer training that ensure all officers start at the same level in meeting the needs of the Objective Force. The first phase of BOLC becomes unnecessary, as graduates of the USMA Commissioning Course would have significantly more training experiences than current ROTC and USMA graduates. With some modifications adequate facilities currently exist at the USMA to produce sufficient numbers of officers to meet the Regular Army’s needs if the program lasted either one or two years.¹³² The consolidation of officer training and divestiture of academic instructor requirements decreases the U.S. Army’s manning requirements for ROTC and USMA staffs. The USMA Commissioning Course maintains all the West Point traditions and values while improving the army profession. ROTC remains present on college campuses to prepare candidates during their undergraduate civilian collegiate experiences. This keeps the U.S. Army rooted in its citizen-soldier traditions and leverages the superb educational experiences offered by

¹³⁰ Lovell, *Neither Sparta nor Athens*, 279-281.

¹³¹ Ibid., 281-283.

¹³² “In 1964, President Johnson signed legislation increasing the strength of the Corps of Cadets from 2,529 to 4,417 (more recently reduced to 4,000).” USMA Homepage, USMA History, Internet www.usma.edu/bicentennial/history/, accessed 9 November 2001. USMA easily accommodates the annual officer requirement of 3500 if the course is one year long. If the course is longer, field training facilities at Camp Buckner and Natural Bridge could be utilized. Additionally, cadets could have longer CTLT and military individual training experiences if the course was two years long.

many universities.¹³³ The emphasis on training at the single commissioning source allows branch basic courses to focus on their particular branch skill sets. Finally, the single commissioning source provides common educations to cadets on relevant military subjects: history, theory and geography. Cadets receive optimal accultuarization to the U.S. Army by an officer led non-commissioned officer cadre chosen from the very best officers and non-commissioned officers.

Disadvantages: Several challenges prevent the U.S. Army from implementing the USMA Commissioning Course proposal. This offer does not support rapid expansion of the army unless full college requirements were waived in crises. If the U.S. Army decides that education does not play a critical role in initial officer assignments, then the commissioning course could be open to all applicants with academic credentials below an undergraduate degree. Under this scenario, the U.S. Army supports officer continuing education in later phases of professional development. Significant resistance from academic and athletic supporters of USMA promises to challenge any effort to overhaul the USMA. However, congressional support for changing the existing system could override USMA concerns.¹³⁴ Increased non-commissioned officer cadre may be required to fulfill the training objectives for the commissioning course, but this is offset by the decreased academic staff requirements. The complexity of completing all university graduation requirements while at the USMA requires close cooperation between specific universities and the USMA. Certain universities may choose to decline cooperation with the USMA. Ending ROTC limits the number of officers available for commissioning into the U.S. Army National Guard and Reserve. Congressional support for development of state commissioning courses at traditional military colleges such as the Citadel, New Mexico Military Institute, North Georgia College, Norwich, Texas A and M and the Virginia Military Institute may alleviate this challenge. The

¹³³ An USAF officer at the Air War College made a similar argument about the role of the USAF in providing undergraduate education. Kenneth G. Truesdale, *Officer Commissioning for the Next Century Training or Education?* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Department of the Air Force Air War College, April 1998), 24-26 passim.

¹³⁴ Remarks by Representative Steve Buyer, Indiana, *Professional Military Education for the 21st Century Warrior - Conference Proceedings*.

recommendation to create the USMA Commissioning Course succeeds in professionalizing the officer corps but requires significant effort to overcome resistance to change and bureaucracy.

Effectiveness: The option to establish the Commissioning Course at the USMA allows U.S. Army officers forty-eight to ninety-six training weeks available to develop the competence necessary to lead Objective Force units (see fig. 4). Centralizing U.S. Army officer commissioning at one location improves the quality control of the officer developmental process. The one to two year commissioning course provides ample opportunity to develop officers as “Warfighters, Servants of the Nation, Members of Profession of Arms, and Leaders of Character.”¹³⁵ Focusing in these areas allows the U.S. Army to effectively guide the profession development of all future officers. The proposal to develop a commissioning course at the USMA in conjunction with a rigorous assessment and selection board guarantees the highest quality new officers for the Objective Force.

COMPARING ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The U.S. Army has already taken the right step in establishing BOLC Phase I. Extending the Basic Officer Leader Course presents the immediate solution to proving U.S. Army leaders with increased competence for an Interim Force. Similarly, establishing an Assessment and Selection Board provides the U.S. Army the best means to evaluate a candidate’s potential as an officer. Both of these recommendations could be implemented with minimal cost and the least change to the current accession process.

The option to establish the USMA as the U.S. Army Officer Commissioning Course represents the boldest proposal that ensures the most control over the profession of U.S. Army Officership. This option requires significant study and preparation before implementation. Supporters of the option face considerable resistance in making such a radical change, but given

¹³⁵ These are the four roles that provide the U.S. Army a professional identity. Don M. Snider, Briefing *The Future of the Army Profession*.

enough Presidential and Congressional support, change may occur.

Requiring enlisted service before commissioning does not presently offer sufficient gain to recommend implementation. The enlisted service vertical accession works for the Germans and Israelis in part, because both nations still use national conscription. If the Land Warrior equipment evolves into a system that takes months to master then the U.S. Army should consider the enlisted service requirement. Like the Israeli Defense Forces, the U.S. Army must rapidly assess and select those candidates with officer potential early in the soldier's career to allow maximum time developing the individual into a competent professional officer. Enlisted service requirements could be developed as a part of the USMA Commissioning Course to indoctrinate officer candidates into the U.S. Army before sending them to university to obtain a degree. This process entails a six-year commissioning process (one year enlisted, four years college and one year commissioning course) but the officer developed from this program would have more experience and likely more maturity. Requiring enlisted service provides sufficient benefits that the proposal deserves consideration if critical developmental experiences result.

The U.S. Army profits significantly by moving to a cyclic readiness program. Unfortunately, the U.S. Army has greater operational commitments than the USMC and therefore cannot readily move towards cyclic readiness. If the U.S. has fewer forces deployed and fewer types of divisions or units, then available U.S. Army force posture may include cyclic readiness. Without these conditions, the U.S. Army must rely on tiered readiness. However, once the U.S. Army fields the Interim and most of the Objective Force, the dialogue should continue to debate the feasibility of U.S. Army cyclic readiness.




Fig. 4. Training Opportunities for Proposed Officer Accessions

One solution to improving the effectiveness of the U.S. Army in warfighting is extending the entry training opportunities for officers. Increasing the institutional pre-commissioning initial entry training forms a bedrock foundation from which leader development grows with operational assignments and self-development. The U.S. Army reaps substantial benefits from immersing officers and officer-candidates in military training experiences. The value of extending initial officer training provides valuable experience that has been tested in history and cited in theory as an essential element of competence.

CONCLUSIONS

The U.S. Army needs to prepare for the future by adapting the officer accession process to meet the needs of the nation for the Twenty-First Century. The force must begin transforming the officer selection and development program now so that by 2010 mid-grade officers are prepared to lead the U.S. Army to successful execution of Objective Force Concepts. The U.S. Army needs to begin practicing Objective Force Concepts with legacy systems and forces today. Transforming officer selection and development immediately helps the U.S. Army to protect the

nation during a period of global instability and peril. Changes should not be made to the officer accession process just for the sake of change. Instead, changes must be sought to achieve a desired endstate that the U.S. Army does not currently meet.

The modification of the officer selection and development process begins with identifying the desired endstate. *The ATLDP Officer Study* describes this endstate:

Other than the TRADOC Common Core, the Army lacks comprehensive officer performance standards (by branch, functional area, and rank) for commissioned officers. The lack of officer standards impacts leader development. Standards are the basis for assessments, feedback, and corrective actions. The Army is a standards-based organization, and yet it has little in the way of objective criteria with which to assess officer performance.¹³⁶

This paper proposes that the desired endstate of initial officer selection and development results in an officer that possesses the character and competence to effectively train and lead a U.S. Army platoon through the accomplishment of all doctrinal battle drills under night conditions, in complex terrain and amongst civilian populations. If platoon leaders require more than six weeks, the average training cycle for U.S. Army infantry battalions, to meet this standard after arriving at their first duty station then the officer entry training should be increased to achieve this standard.

From this endstate, the U.S. Army can determine the competencies required to master during basic officer courses. These competencies define the tactical, technical, conceptual and interpersonal skills required for graduating the basic officer course. The unknown condition at the beginning of the officer basic course is the current competence level of newly commissioned officers from OCS, ROTC and the USMA.

Given that there are minimal centralized standards for the various commissioning sources, the officer training should be developed to meet the needs of the least trained officers. The decrease in available U.S. Army manning has resulted in the downsizing of cadre officers for both ROTC

¹³⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, *The ATLDP Officer Study*, 16.

detachments and the USMA Department of Military Instruction. Understandably, the downsizing has caused some level of decrease in the competence of newly commissioned officers. No effort has been made here to measure the decrease in competence but only to acknowledge that some degradation has occurred. The U.S. Army's solution to this challenge as well as the lack of standard officer training requirements resulted in the implementation for the Pilot BOLC. With the execution of BOLC, the U.S. Army acted to fix an identified shortcoming in the officer selection and development process.

The Pilot BOLC tests the viability of centralizing U.S. Army officer development. After experimenting with the pilot program, the U.S. Army should measure the competence of officers entering and graduating from BOLC. This assessment allows the U.S. Army to determine the length of training necessary to produce effective platoon leaders. This paper postulates that any such study would reveal the need to increase entry officer training. More training does not necessarily produce better quality. However, until the U.S. Army develops the capability to immerse officers in tactical situations to rapidly develop experience, the army may need to rely on quantity of training to gain experience. I recommend that the U.S. Army lengthen BOLC as an intermediate step in the effort to improve officer development. Once the U.S. Army identifies the number of training weeks required to produce a more competent Second Lieutenant, the debate on officer accession begins.

The U.S. Army must decide if the three distinct OCS, ROTC and USMA commissioning programs provide added value or if the Army would be better served with a common commissioning program. The U.S. Army is unique in the world in having such a diverse officer accession process. Perhaps the U.S. Army Transformation causes the Army to call into question the current officer accession. This study recommends that serious consideration be given to developing a post graduate officer commissioning course one to two years in length that provides the training and education (focused on military relevant geography, history, theory and doctrine) required by the Army profession. The commissioning course should serve as the bedrock

foundation for continued professional development through operational assignments, institutional training and individual study.

Whatever the course chosen, the U.S. Army should consider instituting a standardized assessment and selection board to screen officer candidates. The assessment and selection board identifies those most likely to succeed in pre-commissioning programs and as future officers thereby preserving the valuable resources dedicated towards developing leaders.

The effectiveness of the U.S. Army depends upon the quality of its leadership. When resources are allocated, apportionment decisions should reflect the importance of leader development. Officer selection and development must be one of the U.S. Army's highest priorities in order to maintain officership as a profession. To meet the challenge of developing combat leaders capable of conducting complex operations in the current and future operating environment, the U.S. Army relies upon officer selection and development programs. Given the priority of the effort, the U.S. Army owes to itself greater centralized control over the standards for officer selection, development and assessed performance.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE TRUPPENFUHRUNG (UNIT COMMAND), GERMAN ARMY, PUBLISHED 1933

1. War is an art, a free and creative activity founded on scientific principles. It makes the very highest demands on the human personality.
2. The conduct of war is subject to continual development. New weapons dictate ever-changing forms. Their appearance must be anticipated and their influence evaluated. Then they must be placed into service quickly.
3. Combat situations are of an unlimited variety. They change frequently and suddenly and can seldom be assessed in advance. Incalculable elements often have a decisive influence. One's own will is pitted against the independent will of the enemy.* Friction (*Reibung*) and errors are daily occurrences.
4. Lessons in the conduct of war cannot be exhaustively compiled in the form of regulations. The principles enunciated must be applied in accordance with the situation. Simple actions, logically carried out, will lead most surely to the objective.
War subjects the individual to the most severe tests of his spiritual and physical endurance. For this reason, character counts more in war than intellect. Many who distinguish themselves on the battlefield remain unnoticed in peacetime.
6. The command of an army and its subordinate units requires leaders capable of judgment, with clear vision and foresight, and the ability to make independent and decisive decisions and carry them out unwaveringly and positively. Such leaders must be impervious to the changes in the fortunes of war and possess full awareness of the high degree of responsibility placed on their shoulders.
7. An officer is in every sense a leader and a teacher. In addition to his knowledge of men and his sense of justice, he must be distinguished by superior knowledge and experience, by moral excellence, by self-discipline, and by high courage.
8. The example and personal bearing of officers and other soldiers who are responsible for leadership has a decisive effect on the troops. The officer, who in the face of the enemy displays coolness, decisiveness, and courage, carries his troops with him. He also must win their affections and earn their trust through his understanding of their feelings, their way of thinking, and through his selfless care for them. Mutual trust is the surest foundation for discipline in times of need and danger.
9. Every leader in every situation must exert himself totally and not avoid responsibility. Willingness to accept responsibility is the most important quality of a leader. It should not, however, be based upon individualism without consideration of the whole, nor used as a justification for failure to carry out orders where seeming to know better may affect obedience.
Independence of spirit must not become arbitrariness. By contrast, independence of action within acceptable boundaries is the key to great success.
10. The decisive factor, despite technology and weaponry, is the value of the individual soldier. The wider his experience in combat, the greater his importance.
The emptiness of the battlefield (*die Leere des Gefechtsfelds*) requires soldiers who can think and act independently, who can make calculated, decisive, and daring use of every situation, and who understand that victory depends on each individual. Training, physical fitness, selflessness, determination, self-confidence, and daring equip a man to master the most difficult situations.

11. The caliber of a leader and of the men determines the combat power (*Kampfkraft*) of a unit, which is augmented by the quantity, care, and maintenance of their weapons and equipment. Superior combat power can compensate for inferior numbers. The greater this quality, the greater the force and mobility in war. Superior leadership and superior unit readiness are guaranteed conditions for victory.

12. Leaders must live with their troops and share in their dangers and deprivations, their joys and sorrows. Only thus can they acquire a first-hand knowledge of the combat capabilities and needs of their soldiers. The individual is a part of the whole and is not only responsible for himself alone, but also for his comrades. He who is capable of more than the others, who can achieve more, must guide and lead the inexperienced and the weak. Out of such a foundation grows genuine comradeship, which is as important between the leaders and the men as it is among the men themselves.

13. Units that are only superficially held together, not bonded by long training and discipline, easily fail in moments of grave danger and under the pressure of unexpected events. From the very beginning of a war, therefore, great importance must be attached to creating and maintaining inner strength and to the discipline and training of units. It is the duty of every officer to act immediately and with any means at his disposal—even the most severe—against a breakdown in discipline or acts of mutiny, looting, panic, or other negative influences. Discipline is the backbone of an army, and its maintenance is in the best interests of all.

14. The readiness and strength of units must be capable of meeting the highest demands in decisive moments. The commander who needlessly tires his unit jeopardizes success and is responsible for the consequences. The forces deployed in battle must be committed in proportion to the objective. Orders that are impossible to execute will reduce confidence in the leadership and damage morale.

15. Every man, from the youngest soldier upward, must be required at all times and in all situations to commit his whole mental, spiritual, and physical strength. Only in this way will the full force of a unit be brought to bear in decisive action. Only thus will men develop, who will in the hour of danger maintain their courage and decisiveness and carry their weaker comrades with them to achieve deeds of daring.

*The first criterion in war remains decisive action. Everyone, from the highest commander down to the youngest soldier, must constantly be aware that inaction and neglect incriminate him more severely than any error in the choice of means.*¹³⁷

¹³⁷ Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki ed. and trans. *On the German Art of War, Truppengührung*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 2-3.

APPENDIX 2: CHAPTER 3, LEADERSHIP, FM 101-5 FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS OPERATIONS, MAY 22, 1941

97. Leadership is based on knowledge of men.

98. Man is the fundamental instrument in war; other Instruments may change but he remains relatively constant. Unless his behavior and elemental attributes are understood, a gross mistakes will be made in planning operations and in troop leading. In the training of the Individual soldier, the essential considerations are to integrate Individuals into a group and to establish for that group a high standard of military conduct and performance of duty without destroying the initiative of the individual.

99. War places a severe test on the physical endurance and moral stamina of the individual soldier. To perform his duties efficiently, he must not only be well equipped and technically trained but he must also be physically qualified to endure the hardships of field service and be constantly fortified by discipline based on high ideals of military conduct. Strong men, inculcated with a proper sense of duty, a conscious pride in their unit, and a feeling of mutual obligation to their comrades in the group, can dominate the demoralizing influences of battle far better than those imbued only with fear of punishment or disgrace.

100. In spite of the advances in technology, the worth of the individual man is still decisive. The open order of combat accentuates his importance. Every individual must be trained to exploit a situation with energy and boldness and must be imbued with the idea that success will depend upon his initiative and action.

101. The dispersion of troops in battle caused by the influence of modern weapons makes control more difficult. Cohesion within a unit is promoted by good leadership, discipline, pride in the accomplishments and reputation of the unit, and mutual confidence and comradeship among members.

102. Leading troops in combat, regardless of the echelon of command calls for cool and thoughtful leaders with a strong feeling of the great responsibility imposed upon them. They must ~~be~~ be resolute and self-reliant in their decisions, energetic and insistent in execution, and unperturbed by the fluctuations **of combat**.

103. Troops are strongly influenced by the example and conduct of their leaders. A leader must have superior knowledge, will power, self-confidence, initiative, and disregard of self. Any show of fear or unwillingness to share danger is fatal to leadership. On the other hand, a bold and determined leader will carry his troops with him no matter how difficult the enterprise. Mutual confidence between the leader and his men is the surest basis of discipline. To gain this confidence, the leader must find the way to the hearts of his men. This he will do by acquiring an understanding of their thoughts and feelings, and by showing a constant concern for their comfort and welfare.

104. A good commander avoids subjecting his troops to useless hardships; he guards against dissipating their combat strength in inconsequential actions or harassing them through faulty staff management. He keeps in close touch with all subordinate units by means of personal visits and observation. It is essential that he know from personal contact the mental, moral, and physical state of his troops, the conditions with which they are confronted, their accomplishments, their desires, and their needs.

105. The commander should promptly extend recognition for services well done, lend help where help is needed, and give encouragement in adversity. Considerate to those whom he commands, he must be faithful and loyal to those who command him. A commander must live with his troops and share their dangers and privations as well as their joys and sorrows. By personal observation and experience he will then be able to judge their needs and combat value. A commander who unnecessarily taxes the endurance of his troops will only penalize himself. The proper expenditure of combat strength is in proportion to the objective to be attained. When necessary to the execution of the mission, the commander requires and receives from his unit the complete measure of sacrifice.

106. A spirit of unselfish cooperation with their fellows is to be fostered among officers and men. The strong and the capable must encourage and lead the weak and less experienced. On such a foundation, a feeling of true comradeship will become firmly established and the full combat value of the troops will be made available to the higher commander.

107. The combat value of a unit is determined in great measure by the soldierly qualities of its leaders and members and its will to fight. Outward marks of this combat value will be found in the set-up and appearance of the men, in the condition, care, and maintenance of the weapons and equipment, and in the readiness of the unit for action. Superior combat value will offset numerical inferiority. Superior leadership combined with superior combat value of troops constitutes a reliable basis for success in battle.

108. A poorly trained unit is likely to fall in a critical moment due to demoralizing impressions caused by unexpected events in combat. This is particularly true in the first engagements of a unit. Therefore, training and discipline are of great importance. Every leader must take energetic action against indiscipline, panic, pillage, and other disruptive influences. Discipline is the main cohesive force that binds the members of a unit.

109. A wise and capable commander will see that the men assigned to the component groups of his unit are compatible and that the composition of the groups is changed as little as possible. He will provide each group with a leader in whom its members have confidence. He will so regulate the interior administration of the unit that all groups perform the same amount of work and enjoy the same amount of leisure. He will see that demonstrated efficiency is promptly recognized and rewarded. He will set before all a high standard of military conduct and apply to all the same rules of discipline.

110. Good morale and a sense of unity in a command cannot be improvised; they must be thoroughly planned and systematically promoted. They are born of just and fair treatment, a constant concern for the soldier's welfare, thorough training in basic duties, comradeship among men, and pride in self, organization, and country. The establishment maintenance of good morale are Incumbent upon every commander and are marks of good leadership.

111. The first demand in war is decisive action. Commander inspire confidence in their subordinates by their decisive conduct and their ability to gain material advantage over the enemy. A reputation for failure in a leader destroys morale. The morale of a unit is that of its leader. A commander must bear in mind that physical unfitness will undermine his efficiency. He owes it to the men under his command to conserve his own fitness. Neglect renders him unable to bring a normal mind to the solution of his problems, and reacts unfavorably on his whole command.¹³⁸

¹³⁸ *FM 100-5, Field Service Regulation, Operations May 22, 1941*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Reprinted by U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1992), 18-21.

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